SESLER V. MONTGOMERY.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of California.
SESLER v. MONTGOMERY.
i. The speaking of slanderous words by a husband to his wife, is a publication
of them.
2. A communication by a husband to his wife, in regard to a female friend of
hers, accusing her of perjury and want of chastity, hdd, not privileged where the
husband and wife were on bad terms and the plaintiff had testified in her behalf
in divorce proceedings between them.

3. Under a statute providing that evidence is t6 be estimated, not only by its own
intrinsic weight, but also according to the evidence which it is in the power of one
side to produce and the other to contradict, comment to the jury upon the failure
of defendant to introduce his wife to corroborate his own testimony, is proper.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Alameda county.
Action by Mary A. Sesler against A. Montgomery for
slander. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Fstee, Wilson & McCutchen, f C. M11artin, and TV. F. Goad,
for appellant.
W. W Allen, A. R. Cotton, and
dent.

V H. H. Hart, for respon-

HAYNE, C. December 3, 1888. Action for slander. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Several
points are made.

i. It is said that there was no publication. The facts are
that the words were spoken to the defendant's wife, and were
overheard by the plaintiff, who was listening in the corridor.
The point is that husband and wife are in law one person, and
that therefore a communication between them is not "published," within the meaning of the law of slander. It is to be
observed that this is a different thing from saying that the
communication was privileged. There must be a publication
before the question of privilege can arise. We have not been
referred by appellant to any decision in support of the precise
point, except Trumbull v. Gibbons (i 18), 3 City H. Rec. (N.
Y.) 97, decided by an inferior court. We have not had access
to this report, but from the mention of the case in Townshend
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on Slander, we should infer that the decision proceeded on
another ground, and that what is said in relation to the question in hand, is merely a dictum. Nor have we been able to
find any case exactly in point. Upon principle, we should say
that there was a publication. That husband and wife are one
person, is a mere fiction, and is not true for all purposes. The
tendency of modern law, especially in California, is certainly
not to extend the operation of the fiction. Nor do we see any
reason why it should be extended, at least in the present direction. The reputation of a woman can certainly be injured by
slanderous communications to her female friends; and the fact
that the communication came through a husband, would not
ordinarily deprive it of its injurious effect. Furthermore, if
husband and wife are one person to the extent that a communication from the husband to the wife, concerning a third
person is not published, it would seem to follow that a communication from a third person to one of the spouses concerning the other, would not be a communication concerning a
third person, so as to constitute a slander. But the contrary
has been decided. A communication to one of the spouses
concerning the other may be slander: Wenman v. Ash (1853),
13 C. B. 836; Schenck v. Schenck (1843), 2o N. J. L. 2o8;
Odgers on Lib. & Sland. * 152, * 153. That the result is the same
in each case, is stated by Townshend, who says: "The husband or wife of the author or publisher, or the husband or wife
of him, or whose affairs the slander concerns, is regarded as a
third person :" Townshend on Lib. & Sland. § 95. We think,
therefore, that a communication from a husband to his wife
may constitute a publication.
2. It is contended that there was no evidence that the wife
heard or understood the words uttered. The words imputed
to the plaintiff perjury and a want of chastity, and hence were
slanderous per se. They were not ambiguous, and were spoken
of the plaintiff, and could not have referred to any other person. This being the case, the only possible point that can be
made in this regard is that there is no proof that the wife heard
or understood the words at all. It is certainly true that the
slanderous words must be heard and understood. And it may
be conceded that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
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hearing and understanding. But where a man converses with
his wife in a room in such a tone of voice that he can be heard
and understood by a person outside of the room, it is hardly
possible that the wife did not hear and understand him. If the
wife was deaf, or did not understand the language, or any other
peculiar circumstance existed to prevent what would be the
ordinary result, we think the defendant should have proved it.
What was proved was sufficient to overcome the burden we
have assumed to be on the plaintiff in the first instance.
3. It is urged that the communication was privileged. The
Code provides that a privileged communication is one made
"in a communication, without malice, to a person interested
therein, by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in
such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication
innocent, or who is requested by the person interested to give
the information." Civil Code, § 47. It is clear from the above
that, if there be malice, the communication cannot be privileged,
and the question of the existence of malice is one for the jury.
In this case the jury was instructed that, if no malice was
shown, the communication was privileged. It must be assumed
from their verdict, therefore, that they believed that there was
malice; and, although malice is not to be inferred from the
mere fact of the publication (Id. § 48), we cannot say from the
record that the jury was not justified in finding the existence
-of malice. The circumstances were such as to negative the
theory that the communication was for justifiable purposes.
At the time it was made, the defendant was on bad terms with
his wife. A suit for the annulment of the marriage was then
pending. The plaintiff was an acquaintance of the wife, and
had come, at the wife's request, to give the protection of her
presence against any outbreak on the part of the husband.
She had testified on behalf of the wife in the suit above mentioned. The charge of perjury was probably made by the
husband with reference to this testimony, and the inference is
strong that it was resentment on his part at her testifying on
the part of the wife, and not solicitude for the welfare of his
family, that caused him to utter the slander. This inference
is not weakened by the circumstance that the interview beVOL. XXXVII.-x8
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tween the defendant and .his wife was a stormy one; that he
"became so excited" that he called his wife a liar; that the
communication with reference to plaintiff was coarse and
brutal in its nature; and that "he spoke in an angry tone."
Taking everything together, we think there was evidence from
which the jury could infer malice. Hence the communication
was not privileged.
4. It is claimed that there was an irregularity of counsel for
the plaintiff in the argument to the jury. During the trial the
plaintiff called the defendant's wife to the stand, and after she
had been sworn, and testified that she was his wife, the defendant's counsel objected to any further testimony from her, on
the ground that the consent of the defendant to her being a
witness had not been obtained. There was no ruling upon the
point. The plaintiff withdrew the witness, and she was not
subsequently recalled by either party. This left a direct conflict between the plaintiff and the defendant as to whether the
slanderous words were uttered. The plaintiff affirmed the
fact, and the defendant positively denied it. During the argument the plaintiff's counsel began by referring to the objection
which had been made to the wife's testifying, and was proceeding to argue from it that an inference against the truth of the
testimony of the defendant should be drawn. The counsel for
the defendant objected to this line of argument; but the Court
overruled the objection, and the counsel for the plaintiff proceeded with his argument, dwelling mainly upon the failure of
the defendant to call his wife as a witness. We think the action of the Court was proper. Where it is in the power of a
party to call a witness who can corroborate or disprove his
staterients, his failure to call such a witness is a legitimate subject of comment to the jury. Such a case falls within the
scope of subdivision 6 of section 2o61 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "evidence is to be estimated
not only by its own intrinsic weight, but also according to the
evidence which it is in the power of one side to produce, and
of the other side to contradict." See, also, Gray v. Burk
(857), 19 Tex. 228. The non-production of evidence in such
case is a circumstance from which the jury may draw an infer"efce of fact. If this is so, it is permissible to counsel to ask
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them to draw such inference; and it is a matter of every-day
occurrence for counsel to make such arguments. The case is
not similar to that of a person accused of crime; for the statute
expressly provides, with reference to cases where the prisoner
does not testify, that "his neglect or refusal to be a witness
cannot in any manner prejudice him, nor be used against him
on the trial or other proceeding:" Pen. Code, §1323. Now,
in the present case, the wife was perfectly competent to be a
witness if the defendant had consented. The slanderous words
having been alleged to have been spoken to her, she could
have corroborated or disproved his statements; and the circumstances excluded any idea that the communication was in
fact confidential. He exercised much ingenuity to avoid admitting that she was his wife. His failure to consent was the
sole reason she could not testify; and under the circumstances
we think that the case falls within the rule above stated, and
that the failure to give his consent was a subject of comment
to the jury. It is to be observed that there was no ruling of
the Court upon the admissibility of the testimony, the witness
having been withdrawn before a ruling was made; and there
was no attempt to argue against the justice of the law, or to
induce the jury to disregard the law, and it is therefore unnecessary to express an opinion as to what would have been the
result, had such circumstance existed. Moreover, we are not
to be understood as saying that in every case in which a party
fails to produce a witness, such failure may be commented on
to the jury. The fact sought to be inferred may not be an
issue in the case, (Fletcherv. State (I874), 49 Ind. 124), or
may not be proper for the consideration of the jury: Rudolpk
v. Landwerlen (1883), 92 Id. 34. The whole subject of the
latitude to be allowed counsel in argument, rests very much
in the discretion of the trial court, and an exercise of such
discretion should not be disturbed, except in a clear case. The
other points do not require special notice. We do not see any
contradiction in the instructions. The charge of the Court
seems to have correctly presented the case to the jury. We
think that the defendant had a fair trial, and we therefore advise that the judgment and order appealed from be affirmed.
We concur: BELCHER, C. C.; FOOTE, C.
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For the reasons given in the foregoing opinPER CURIAM.
ion the judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.
McFARLAND, J., (concurring.) I concur in the judgment;
but I am not prepared to say that there would have been a
publication, if, at the time the sland&ous words were spoken
by defendant to his wife, he had been living with her in the
friendly and confidential relation which usually exists between
husband and wife.
Except in an early case in New
York, in a city court, where it was said
that the delivery of a libel by the author to his wife is privileged, ( Trumbull v. Gibbons (1818), 3 City H. Rec.
(N. Y.) 97), the main question in the
principal case has not heretofore arisen
in our courts. Mr. Odgers states that it
has never arisen in England, "probably because in every such case there
has been an immediate and undoubted
publication of the same slander or an exaggerated version thereof by the wife
to some third person, for which the
husband would be equally answerable
in damages and which would be easier
to prove ;" adding that, in his opinion,
such a communication would enjoy the
same privilege as that which issupposed
to attach to matters divulged by a
Roman Catholic to his priest, underthe
seal of confession: Odgerson Libel and
Slandter, 153. But the Supreme Court
of California, in the principal case,
takes a different view ; s. c., 28 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 125; and this
opinion is somewhat strengthened by a
decision of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in a case decided in the same
month.
This was a prosecution for criminal
slander under the North Carolina code,
for charging a woman with incontinency. The words were spoken to the
prosecuting witness, the defendant's
wife being a short distance away. On
the trial, the defendant's counsel asked
for an acquittal, on the ground that the

"legal entity" of the wife being
merged, "husband and wife are one
person," and, therefore, words spoken
by the husband in the presence of the
wife are protected; and "assuming
that the supposed defamatory words
were spoken in the hearing of a third
person," the wife is not such a person,
within the meaning of the law; and if
she were such a third person, the fact
that she was "a short distanci off," is
not sufficient to prove that she heard the
defamatory words. The Court overruled the objection; and, on appeal, its
ruling was sustained, DAvis, J., saying:
"We are unable to see the force of this
objection. The words spoken were not
of a gentle and confidential character
between husband and wife, but spoken
in a loud tone, which could have been
heard a long way off; and, besides, it
appears from the testimony in behalf of
the defendant, that a negro woman was
near, and that the witness, John Lytle,
was in hearing, though he testified that
the language used by the defendant was
different from that charged by the prosecutrix :" State v. Shoemaker S. Ct.
N. C., Dec. 18, x888. 28 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER, 190.

Defamatory words are not actionable
until they are published, and by publication is meant the putting of the
slander before one or more persons
other than the plaintiff. To slander a
person to his face, is not actionable, unless some one overhears it; nor is it, to
send an enclosed letter, containing de-
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famatory matter, to the plaintiff: Cooley
on Torts, 193 ; Lyle v. Clason (18o4), I
Cai. (N. Y.) 581 ; Spaits v. Poundstone (1882), 87 Ind. 522; McIntosh v.
Matherly (1848), 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 1x9;
Broderick v. James (187), 3 Daly
(N. Y.) 481; Desmond v. Browzn
(1871), 33 Iowa, 13. All/er, where
one is prosecuted criminally and not
sued: State v. Avery (1828), 7 Conn.
266. A proprietor of a newspaper
cannot be found to have published a
libel, unless it is proved to have been
read, as well as printed and sold:
Prescott v. T7ousey (1884), 5o N. Y.
Super. Ct. 12.
But to constitute a publication the
libel need not be made known to the
public generally; it is sufficient if it be
made known to a single third person:
Adams v. Lawson (1867), 17 Grat.
(Va.) 250.
To shout defamatory words where no
one can hear them, is not a publication
of them; but if any one is within bearing, it is no defence that the defendant
did not intend them to be heard by the
person: Shepherdv. Whitaker (1875),
L. R. to C. P. 502. Nor is it a publication to speak them to the person defamed, even though the place is a public one, if no other person hears them:
ShefIlv. VanZeusen (1859), 13 Gray
(Mass.) 304. It is no publication of a
slander to speak it in a foreign language,
which no one present understands:
Keene v. Ruff (1855), I Iowa 482.
To prove the publication of a libel written
in German, it must be shown that it was
read by some one other than the plaintiff who understood German: Afielenz
v. Quasdorf (1886), 68 Iowa 726;
K. v. H. (1866), 20 Wis. 239. But
this does not apply to a libel printed in
a foreign language: Palnerv. Harris
(1869), 6o Pa. 156.
The publication must be made by
the defendant. If the party to whom
the slanderous words are spoken, or the

written libel is sent, being the one defamed, gives it to the world, the defendant is not responsible: Fonville v.
M'Nease (1838), Dudl. (S. C.) 303.
But the words are actionable, although
spoken when no one else is present, to
one who knows them to be false and
who does not repeat them until after
action is brought: Marble v. Chapit
(1882), 132 Mass. 225. And an injunction of secrecy by the defendant to
witness, is no defence : .ilcGo-wan v.
Afanifee (1828),7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 314.
To have a libelous writing in one's
possession is no publication: Odgers,
*152; neither is it to post up a libelous
placard, if it is taken down before any
one sees it: Odgers, *153. A defamatory writing is no libel, so long as it
remains in the possession of the composer and is seen by no one else; but
if he keeps such a paper in his possession, he must at his peril see that it
does not fall into the hands of others;
if it does, the publication is in law attributable to him as the party who originated the wrong and was the means of
its becoming injurious: Cooley on Torts,
281.
But Mr. Odgers says (page 152):
"If I compose or copy a libel and keep
the manuscript in my study, intending
to show it to no one, and it is stolen by
a burglar and published by him, it is
submitted that there is no publication
by me, either in civil or criminal proceedings. But it would be a publication by me, if through any default of
mine it got abroad, whether thiough
my negligence or folly," citing Wir v.
Hoss (1844), 6 Ala. 88x, which seems
to hold that a publication without the
author's consent, is no publication as to
him.
It is a publication to deliver it to a
person who would necessarily read it,
even though it is not proved that in the
particular case, he did read it; as delivering a newspaper to a revenue commissioner to stamp it: A'. v. Amphlet
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(1825), 4 B. & C. 35 ; or a manuscript
to a printer : Baldwin v. Elphinston
(1775), 2 W. B. 1037; Trumbullv.
Gibbo,ns (iS18), 3 City H. Rec. (N. Y.)
97 ; or to send a libel by telegraph:
Whitfeld v. R. Co. (1858), E. B. & E.
I 15 ; Williamson v. Freer (1874), L.
R. 9 C. P. 393; or by postal card:
Robinson v. Jones (1879), 4 L. R. Ir.
391. Where A., by mistake, directed
and posted a libel on B. to B's employer, instead of to B., this was held a
publication: Fax v. Broderick (1864),
14 Ir. C. L. 453. So where A. wrote
a libelous letter to B., but showed
it to C. before posting it: Snyder v.
Andrevs (1849), 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 43;
At'Combs v. Tuttle (I840), 5 Blackf.
(Ind.) 431. So, where the defendant
knew that the plaintift's letters were
always opened by his clerk in the morning and sent a libelous letter addressed
to the plaintiff, which was opened and
read by the plaintiff's clerk, lawfully
and in the usual course of business, this
was held a publication by the defendant
to the plaintiff's clerk: Delacroix v.
Thevenot (1817), 2 Stark. 56. So,
where the defendant, before posting the
letter to the plaintiff, had it copied, this
was held a publication to his own clerk
who copied it: AXene v..Ruff (1855),
x Iowa 482. Where, however, though
a third person may have had an opportunity of reading the libel, if he actually
did not, it is no publication: Odgers,
*153. It is no publication by one who
picks up and delivers a sealed letter,
the contents of which are unknown to
him: Fonville v. Af'Arease (1838),
Dudl. (S. C.) 303. So, where a person
wrote a letter and gave it to another
to deliver folded, but not sealed, and
the messenger delivered it to the plaintiff without reading it, it was held no
publication: Chutterbuck v. Chaffers
(I816), I Stark. 382; Day v. Bream
(1837), 2 Moo. & R. 54. A communication of a slander on a man to his

wife, is a publication : Wenman v. Ash
(1853), 13 C. B. 836; or to any member of his family: Afiller v. Johnson
(1875), 79 IL 58. It is a publication
to give it to the agent of the plaintiff:
'Brunswick v. Ilarmer(1849), 14 Q. B.
185. As soon as the manuscript of a
libel has passed out of the defendant's
possession and control, it is published
as to him. Thus a letter is published
as soon as posted, and in the place
where it is posted, if it is ever opened
anywhere, by any third person: Ward
v. Smith (1814), 6 Binn. (Pa.) 749;
Clegg v. Lafer (1833), 3 Moo. &
Sc. 727; Warren v. Warren (1834),
I C. M. & R. 250; Shipley v. Todhunter (1836), 7 C. & P. 680.
The publication of a libel is sufficiently proved when it appears that a
letter in the handwriting of the defendant, containing the libel, was found in
the house of a neighbor of the person
libeled, and by such neighbor and a
third person opened and read: Swinhdle
v. State (1831), 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 581;
A letter stating that the writer had heard
of a slanderous report, is admissible in
evidence to prove the circulation of the
report, and may be read for that purpose, the handwriting of the person
being proved; but it is not admissible
to prove that the defendant had propagated the report: Schwartz v. Thomas
(1795), 2 Wash. (Va.) 167. Evidence
that a newspaper came from the defendant's office and was one copy of an
edition of the same date, is proof of
publication: State v. Jeandel (1854), 5
Harr. (Del.) 475.
Distributing newspapers containing
libelous matter and receiving money
for them by an agent, is sufficient evidence of publication: Resoublica v.
Dazs (1801), 3 Yeates (Pa.) 128.
Where a witness swore that he was a
printer, and had been in the office of
the defendant where a certain paper
was printed, and saw it printed there,
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and the paper produced by the plaintiff
was, he believed, pinted with the types
used in the defendant's office, it was
heldrimafacieevidence of the publication by the defendant: Southwick v.
Stecns (1813), io Johns. (N. Y.) 443.
So, where the libel was published in a
newspaper printed in another State, but
which usually circulated in a particular
county in Massachusetts, and the number containing the libel was actually
received and circulated in the given
county, this was held conclusive evidence of a publication within the county: Cotnmnonwallv.Blanding(i825),
3 Pick. (Mass.) 304.
The entry of the resolution of excommunication from membership in a
church on the minute book of the session, and the exhibition of it to the
members for their signatures, does not
constitute a publication: Landis v.
C'ampbell (I883), 79 Mo. 433. Where,
pending prosecution of a criminal charge
against A., defendant wrote to A.'s
father, stating that he was reliably informed that the prosecuting attorney had
been bribed to release A. on consideration of the father employing,him on a
contingent fee in a suit against defendant, this was held a sufficient publication: Young v. Clegg (1883), 93 Ind.
37L
Where the only publication is one
brought about by the plaintiff's own
act, it has been held that this is not sufficient to give the right of action; on
the principle of the maxim, volen/i non
Pit injuria. Damages cannot be recovered for the repetition of slanderous
words spoken by another, whether true
or false, when such words were repeated
by the defendant, at the request of the
plaintiff: Haynes v. Leland (1848), 29
Me. 233; Si/tton v. Smith (1850), 13
Mo. 12O; Xing v. Waring (188), 5
Esp. 13; Smiith v.
ood (182), 3
Camp. 323; Warr v. Joly (1834), 6
C. & P. 497 ; Weathers/on v. Hawkins

(1786), 1 T. R. I1O; Ilop0woodv. Torn
(i849),8 C. B.2 9 1; bnvillev. M'Aease
(1838), Dudl. (S. C.) 303; Nott v.
Stoddard (I865), 38 Vt. 25; Heller v.
Howard (1882), II Bradw. (IL1.) 554Contra, Diuke of Brunswickv. Hay-ver
(1849), x4 Q.B. 185; which holds that
where the words have been previously
uttered, suit may be brought on a repetition sought by plaintiff. And in Griffths v. Lewis (1845), 7 Q. B. 60, Lord
DENMAN, C. J., said: "Injurious words
having been uttered by the defendant
respecting the plaintiff, the plaintiff was
bound to make inquiry on the subject.
When she did so, instead of any satisfaction from the defendant, she gets only
a repetition of the slander. The real
question comes to this, does the utterance of slander once, give the privilege
to the slanderer to utter it again, whenever he is asked for an explanation ? It
is the constant course when a person
hears that he has been calumniated, to
go with a witness to the party who he
is informed has uttered the injurious
words and say, "Do you mean, in the
presence of witnesses, to persist in the
charge you have made?" And it is
never wise to bring an action for slander, unless some such courge has been
taken. But it never has been supposed
that the persisting and repeating the
calumny in answer to such a question,
which is an aggravation of the slander,
can be a privileged communication;
and in none of the cases cited has it
ever been so decided." Where, within
six months before suit brought, the defendant said concerning the words
alleged to be actionable, but which were
barred by the statute, "I never denied
what I have said and I will stand up to
it," this was held not a repetition of
what he had previously said, and that
an action could not be sustained thereon:
Fox v. lVilson (1856), 3 Jones (N. C.)
485. So, where the plaintiff, after receiving a libelous letter from the defen-
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dant, sent for a friend of his and also
for the defendant, and then repeated
the contents of the letter in their presence, and asked the defendant if he
wrote that letter, the defendant, in the
presence of the plaintiff's friend, admitted that he had written it, this was
held no publication by the defendant
to the plaintiff's friend: Fonville V.
Of'Nease (1838), Dudl. (S. C.) 303.
The testimony given by a witness on
a trial, in which he acknowledged the
uttering of certain words to be slanderous, cannot be proved as an admission,
in a subsequent action for slander
brought against him: Osborn v. Forshee
(1871), 22 Mich. 209.
Proof that the words were spoken to
plaintiff, or in his presence, need not be
made; it suffices to show that they were
spoken to a different person : Ware v.
Cartledge (1854), 24 Ala. 622. Where
a letter containing a libel is sent sealed,
and the writer subsequently states in the
presence of witnesses that he had got a
certain person to write it for him, and
that he had signed his name to it and
kept a copy, and also states what the
contents were, but does not produce the
copy, this is a sufficient publication:
Adams v. Lawson (1867), 17 Grat.
(Va.) 250.
The moral or intellectual character of
the person in whose hearing the slander
is uttered, is irrelevant: Sheffill v. Van
Deusen (1859), 13 Gray (Mass.) 304.
JOHN D. LAWSON.
San Francisco, Cal.

Communications to attorneys-at-law
physicians and clergymen are often
privileged, when made in the course of
a specific retainer or confession: see
Leading Article, January, 1889 (xxviiL
A. L. R. i), and State Statutes (Id. x621).

Communications to a prosecuting attorney by a person enquiring whether
the facts communicated make out a case
of larceny for a criminal prosecution, are
absolutely privileged: Vogel v. Gruaz,
1o U. S. 311 (abstract of same case,
xxiii. A. L. REG. 273).
So, commuications to a body of citrzens, respecting the character of m
nominee for judicial office, are privileged, unless there is actual malice:
Briggs v. Garrett, xxv. A. L. R. 493;
Spiering v. Andrae, xviii. Id. 186;
though, if false, and published in a
newspaper, the editor cannot invoke the
privilege: Bronson v. Bruce, xxv. Id.
509, and note.
Communications made during an interview, sought by the accused and his
friend, with the defendant, are privileged: Billings v. Fairbanks,xxiii. A.
L. REG. 549.

There is no privilege attached to
slanderous words spoken privately to
one who knows them to be false and
does not repeat them until after the
action is brought: Alarble v. Chopin,
xxii. A. L. REo. 78.
Privilege depends upon public policy:
note to Alunster v. Lamb, xxiii. A. L..
REc. 19-25.
J. B. U.

SWITZER V. CITY OF WELLINGTON.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
SWITZER v. CITY OF WELLINGTON.
A city cannot be garnisheed and made liable to pay a creditor of its creditor.
without express statutory provision.
This exemption is based entirely upon grounds of public policy, as otherwise the
usefulness and power of municipal corporations, in the discharge of their functions,
would be impaired, and the municipalities subjected to duties, liabilities and expenditures, merely to promote private interest and convenience.
The Kansas statutes relating to garnishments and cities of the second class, do
not authorize the creditor of a municipality's creditor to attach moneys due and
owing by the municipal corporation.

Error to the District Court of Sumner County.
Action against a city to recover a sum attached by garnishee
process, under Section 54a , c. 8i, Comp. Laws of 1879 (page
706 of Comp. Laws of 1885), which provides"That in all personal actions arising upon contract, before justices of the peace,
if the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, shall file with the justice, at the time of or
after the commencement of suit, an affidavit that he has good reason to believe,
and does believe, that any corporation or person to be named, and within the
county where the action is brought, has property, money, goods, chattels, credits,
and effects in his hands, or under his contract [control], belonging to the defendant, or that such corporation or person is anywise indebted to the principal
defendant (naming him), is justly indebted to the plaintiff in a given amount over
and above all legal set-off, and that the plaintiff has good reason to, and does, believe that he will lose the same unless a garnishee summons issue to the aforesaid
person, a garnishee summons shall be issued and personally served, in the same
manner as an ordinary summons, and from the time of such service the garnishee
shall stand liable to the plaintiff for all property, money, and articles in his hands,.
or due from him to the defendant."

John M. Graham and Isaac G. Reed, for the plaintiff in error.
W. R. Staj'ebaclz and Lawrence & Ferguson, for the defendant in error.
HOLT, C., November Io, I888. On January 8, 1883, H.
Switzer, the plaintiff in error, brought an action in a justice's
court against James Cronin, and recovered judgment by con-

fession on the 12th day of January.

At the same time, he

served a garnishee process upon P. A. Wood, mayor of the
city of Wellington. Upon the 22d of January, the mayor
answered under oath that the city was indebted to James
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Cronin in the sum of $45.88. The city failing to pay this
amount, the plaintiff brought this action to recover it. Judgment was rendered for the defendant in the justice's court, and
the case was taken to the Sumner district court on error,
where the judgment was reversed, and the case held for trial
in said court. Upon trial, judgment was again rendered for
the defendant.
It appears that the city of Wellington was indebted to
Cronin, on a contract for work upon the streets, but it was
agreed in open court, that the only question sought to be presented here, should be whether or not a municipal corporation
should be required to answer as a garnishee in a justice's court.
The plaintiff contends that Section 54a, c. 8 I, Comp. Laws, 1879,
authorizes such a proceeding. It is as follows: [as above.]
It is contended that the phrase "any corporation or person,"
includes a city of the second class; that the term "corporation" is used without limitation, and would embrace not only
private, but public corporations. We think that the term
"' corporation," as used in this section, has reference solely to
private corporations, organized for private purposes, and does
not include municipal corporations. Cities are a part of the
government, and should not be required to become involved
in litigation in which they have no interest. This exemption
from garnishee process is based entirely upon the ground of
public policy. The reasons given by different courts are
numerous; among others, that it would impair the usefulness
and power of such corporations in the discharge of their functions. It would draw cities into litigation, and occupy the
time of their officers in expensive and vexatious suits in which
they had no interest, and would compel them to expend the
money of the people and the time of their officials on a matter
wholly foreign to their creation. It might impede public improvements, and the execution of contracts in which the public
would be interested. In Merwin v. City of Chicago (I867), 45
Ill. 133, the Court says: "But, in our opinion, the city should
not be subjected to this species of litigation, no matter what
may be the character of its indebtedness. If we hold it
must answer in all cases, and the exemption from liability be
allowed to depend, in each case, upon the character of the
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indebtedness, we shall leave it liable to a vast amount of litigation in which it has no interest, and obliged to spend the
money of the people and the time of its officials in the management of matters wholly foreign to the object of its creation.
A municipal corporation cannot be properly turned into an
instrument or agency for the collection of private debts. It
exists simply for the public welfare, and cannot be required to
consume the time of its officers or the money in its treasury,
in defending suits, in order that one private individual may the
better collect a demand due from another. A private corporation must assume the same duties and liabilities as private
individuals, since it is created for private purposes. But a
municipal corporation is part of the government. Its powers
are held as a trust for the common good. It should be permitted to act only with reference to that object, and should not
be subjugated to duties, liabilities, or expenditures, merely to
Wallace v.
promote private interest or private convenience."
Lawyer (1876), 54 Ind. 5oi; HcDougalv.Hennepin Co. (186o), 4
Minn. 184; i Dillon on Mun. Corp., § ioo; State v. Eberly (1882),
12 Neb. 6 16; Hawthorn v. City of St. Louis (1847), I1 Mo. 59;
Erie v. Knapp (1857), 29 Pa. 173; Mayor, etc., v. Rowland
(1855), 26 Ala. 498; Mayor of Baltimorev. Root (1855), 8 Md.
'95; Burnham v. City of Fond du Lac (1862), 15 Wis. 193;
Buffham v. City of Racine (1870), 26 Id. 449; School-Dist. v.
Gage (1878), 39 Mich. 484; McLellen v. Young (1875), 54 Ga.
399; Drake on Attachm. § 516; 2 Wade on Attachm. §§ 345,
419; Waples on Attachm. & Garn. 236 et seq. See, also,
McCubbin v. Atchinson (1873), 12 Kan. 166, and notes of reo
-porter on pages 169-7 . The authorities are not entirely
uniform. Contra: City of Newark v. Funk (1864), I5 Ohio
St. 462, in which the court held that a municipal corporation
-could be garnisheed. The statute of Ohio provides that any
-claims or choses in action, due or to become due to the judgment debtor, and all money, goods and effects, which he may
have in the hands of any person, body politic or corporate,
may be made subject to the payment of a judgment: Rev.
Stat. Ohio, ed. 1884, § 5464. Also, IWilson v. Lewis (1872), 10
R. I. 285 ; Bray v. Town of Wallingford (1850), 20 Conn. 416;
Adams v. Tyler (1876), 121 Mass. 380.
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Plaintiff contends, if this were the ordinary and fair inter-pretation of section 54a, the defendant has waived it by the
answer of the mayor to the garnishee process; and cites Clapp
v. Walker (r868), 25 Iowa 315. That authority is not applicable in this case. That action was brought against a school
district, and the district admitted an indebtedness for a part of
the amount claimed, and denied its indebtedness for any
greater sum. A trial was had, and verdict set aside; and,.
after the evidence was all introduced in the second trial, theCourt was asked to instruct the jury that a municipal corpora-tion could not be garnisheed, and therefore was not liable. In
the [present] action of Switzer v. Cronin, the mayor, in response to garnishee summons, answered simply that the city
was owing Cronin $45.88. When this action was brought
against the"city, it denied its liability at once, and has contested
this action, on the ground that, being a municipal corporation,.
it was not answerable to Switzer for any amount it might beowing Cronin. The plaintiff calls our attention to section 102,.
c. 18, Comp. Laws, relating to cities of the first class, which,
is: "Lands, houses, moneys, debts due the city, and property,.
and assets of every description belonging to any city under
this act, shall be exempt from taxation, execution, and sale,
and such cities shall not be required to answer as garnishee in
any action." And also to section 104, c. I9,relating to cities.
of the second class, as follows: "All lands, houses, moneys,
debts due the city, and property and assets of every description, belonging to any city or municipal corporation, * * *
shall be exempt from taxation." The plaintiff contends that
because the clause, "and such cities shall not be required toanswer as garnishee in any action," is omitted in section Io4of chapter I9,it was intended that cities of the second class.
should be required to answer as garnishee, and that under the
ordinary rules of construction, cities of the first class only were
intended to be exempt. We concede the force of this argument, but it does not necessarily follow, because it was inserted
in the law governing cities of the first class, that the rule would
have been otherwise if it had been left out. The acts relating
to cities of the first and second class were enacted at different
times; the one concerning cities of the second class in 1872,
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-and the other in 8I. We cannot say that the omission from
the earlier act was intentional. We believe the rule to be, before a city is required to answer in garnishee proceedings, there
must be an express provision of the statute compelling them
to do so. This being the law, its omission would not justify
the inference of plaintiff The rule of construction contended
for by plaintiff is not clearly applicable to the statutes cited and
-compared, and we think such construction should yield to the
more important question of public policy; and that no city,
without an express provision of the statute, should be drawn
into litigation in which it has no interest, and wholly foreign
to the purposes of its creation, and the money of the people
expended, and the time of its officials devoted to matters of no
public interest or benefit. We therefore recommend that the
decision of the court below be affirmed.
Per Cturiam. It is so ordered.
HORTON, C.

J., and

JOHNSTON,

J., concur.

VALENTINE,

J.,

dissents.
Municipal corporations are, in many
respects, part and parcel of the Government, and most attempts to garnishee
them have been made for the purpose
of reaching the salaries of the officials
employed by them, in their governmental capacity. Now, it is settled
that the salary of an officer of the United
States cannot be attached: S,a/ling v.
.Imlay (1793), 1 Root (Conn.) 551;
Averill v. Tucker (1824), 2 Cranch.
(U. S. C. Ct.; D. C.) 544; Buchanan
v. Alexander (1846), 4 How. (45
U. S.) 2o. And there is the same
unanimity with respect to the salaries
,of officers of particular States in the
American Union: Stillman v. .sh am
(1835), I1 Conn. 124; Wicksv.Branch
Bank (1847), 12 Ala. 594; In re
,Meekin v. State (1849), 9 Ark. 553;
Bank of Tennessee v. Dibrell(1855), 3
-Sneed (Tenn.) 379; Dobbins v. Or. &
.Al. R. R. Co. & Super. of the W. &A.
R. R. Co., Garnishee (1867), 37 Ga.
.24o; Bulkley v. Eckert (1846), 3 Pa.

36S; Tracy v. Hornmuckle (871), 8
Bush (Ky.) 336.
Only two cases have been found, in
which the salary of a counly official was
sought to be reached, and boh arose in
Massachusetts; in the first one, it was
held not to be attachable: Chealy v.
Brewer(0811), 7 Mass. 259; but a different view of the subject was taken in
the same State sixty-five years later:
Adams v. Tj'ler (1876), 121 Id. 380.
With respect to the salaries of city officials, out of ten cases, seven hold that
these may not be attached: Bradley v.
Richmond(1834), 6 Vt. 121 ; Hawthorn
v. St. Louis (1847), i iMo. 59; M2ayor
&'c.,if Alobile v. Roland 6-. Co. (1855),
26Ala. 498; Mlayor, &ic., of Baltimore
v. Root (1855), 8 Md. 95; Hoytv. Experience (1858), g6 Ga. 113; Clark v.
Lee's Assignee (Ct. App. Ky., 1875), 12
Alb. L. J. 391; Walkerv. Cook (I88o),
129 Mass. 577; and three that they may
be attached; Speed v. Brown (1849),
Io B. Mon. (Ky.) Io8; Sinoot v. Hart
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(1858), 33 Ala. 69; Wilson v. Lewis

(872), iO R. 1. 285.
The case of Hadyv.Peabody (1859),
13 Gray (Mass.) 200, was an attempt to
attach a teacher's salary, which was
payable quarterly. The process was
served in the middle of the quarter.
The Court said, "The plaintiff contends
that the city must be charged for the
part of a quarter's salary, proportioned
to that part of the time which had
elapsed at the time since the beginning
of the quarter. * * * * It was not a
debt, it might not become a debt; the
contract was entire, and until completed
on the part of the teacher, nothing was
due. We think this point is settled by
authorities." The intimation is plain
here, that, if the salary of a whole quarter had been due, the attachment would
have been sustained.
Speedv. Brown (1849), I0 B. Mon.
(Ky.) io8, was an attempt to reach the
salary due a city Marshal. A bill was
filed for that purpose in equity. The
Court said, "It seems to us that, as the
city is a corporation which may be sued,
a creditor unable by execution at law to
coerce his debt, may subject to that debt
the muney actually due and owing from
the city to the officer, for services, at the
time of the commencement of the suit
fully rendered, or where the money has
been set apart for his use, and subject
immediately to his demand." But it
was held not to be practicable so to
collect a future salary, because that
might drive the debtor from the public
service.
Seven cases have also been found in
which it is not clear whether official
salaries were involved or not; in four
of them, MckYhidden v. Drake &"
Portsmouth (1829), 5 N.H. 13; Ward
v.Coity of Hartford(1838), 12 Coun.
404; Bray v. Wallin'gford (185o), 20
Id. W!6; Heebser v. Chave (1847), 5
Pa. 115, the attachment was sustained.
In three, Erie v. Knapp ([857), 29

Pa. 173; 11IcDougall v. Supervsors
of Hennepin Co. (186o), 4 Minn. 184;
Af1erwin v. Chicago (1867), 45 IIL 133,
it was not. If we confine ourselves
to those cases in which it is certain
that municipal salaries were in question, we see that the decisions are
more than two to one in favor of their
exemption from garnishment.
As the law in question is judicial and
not statutory, when it comes to be applied for the first time in any jurisdiction, the authorities are rightly to be
considered, not with reference to their
number alone, but also, and perhaps
mainly, with reference to the strength
and conclusiveness of their reasoning.
And this reasoning may, for convenience, be considered under three heads,
the first of which has been based on the
assumption that, in the language of
Bradleyv. Richmond (1834),6 Vt. 121,
"the phraseology of the act implies
personal privileges." Now, not only
are "personal privileges" implied in
attachment laws-as, indeed, in what
law are they not, save in laws having
reference solely to official status ?-but,
in most of them, the word "person" is
actuallyapplied to the garnishee. And
the question, therefore, is, did the legislature intend to include a municipal
corporation by that word? A strong
side light is shed upon the question by
cases in which ordinary corporations
have sought to evade responsibility on
the ground that they were not "persons," within other statutes than those
of attachment.
Blackstone's definition of "person"
appears to have been framed expressly
for the purpose of including corporations. He says: "Persons are divided
by law into either natural persons, or
artificial; natural per-ons are such as
the God of nature formed us; artificial
are such as are created and devised by
human laws for the purposes of society
and government, which are called cor
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Comm. 123.
So, an American Judge has said that
it does "not require the aid of the legislature to prove that the word Person
in a statute may extend to a corporation
as well as to a natural person. That a
State is a corporation cannot be doubted.
It is a legal being, capable of transacting some kinds of business, like a
natural person, and such a being is a
State of Indiana v.
corporation:"
Woram (1843), 6 Hill (N. Y.) 33, and
again: "The word person, in its legal
sense, is a generic term and was intended to include artificial as well as
natural persons;" Douglas v. Pac. A.
St. (x854), 4 Cal. 304. Yet, notwithstanding the self-evident accuracy of
these propositions, the. ingenuity of corporation counsel has been exhausted in
the repeated efforts to save their clients
from the operation of statutes, which, in
terms, applied to " any person." Thus,
it had to be expressly decided, that a
railroad company was a "person"
within the Statute of Limitations: 01cott v. Tioga R. R. (1859), 20 N. Y.
210; Thomvpon v. Tioga R. R. (1861),
36 Barb. (N. Y.) 79; and could appeal
as a "person" owning land: Peojple v.
May (t858),27 Batb. (N.Y.) 238; and
might, as a "person," be sued in the
county where a trespass was committed:
Bat tee v. Houston, &'c., R.R. (1871-2),
36 Tex. 648; and was a "person"
within a statute relating to taxation:
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Commonwealth (1866), I Bush (Ky.), 250,
and this was afterwards extended to
Wallace v.
municipal corporations:
Mayor, &'c., of New York (1859), 2
Hilt. (N.Y.) 44o; and it was held that
the bonds of a life insurance company
were "personal estate," within the
meaning of such a statute: Brit. Corn.
Life Ins. Co. v. Com. of Taxes (1865),
3 N. Y. 32; s.c. (1864), 18 Abb.
Prac. nS, and (1864), i Abb. App.

.porations or bodies politic:"
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Dec. 199; and that a bank was within
such a statute, where the word used
Ontario Bank
was "inhabitants:"
v. Bunnell (1833), 1o Wend. (N.
Y.) 186; and so with a manufacturing company, where the words were
Parker
"persons or associations:"
Mills v. Com. of Taxes (1861), 23 N.
Y. 242; and it was also held that such
a company might, as a "1person," give
its promissory note, and was within the
Statutes of 3 & 4 Anne : M ottv. Hick,
(1823), i Cow. (N. Y.) 513. See, also,
State of Indiana v. WPoram (1843), 6Hill (N. Y.) 33, and within the protect ion given to "persons" by the Act
of Congress of April 20, 1871 : N. W.
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1873), S
480-2;
Biss. (U. S. C. Ct., N. D. Ill.)
and that a bank was a "person," within
a statute against usury: ThorntonBank
of Washington (1830), 3 Pet. (28 U.
S.) 36. See, also, Com. Bk. of Man(1843), 7 How. (Miss.)
chester v. "lolan
5o8; Grand Gulf Bank v. Archer
(1847), 8 S.& M. (Miss.) 151; and
that a steamboat company was a
"person" within an Act for the commencement of process: Douglas v.
Pac. A St. (1854),4 Cal.3o4,andwas
a carrier, responsiLle as a "person" for
injury: Chase v. Amer. Steamboat Co.
(1871), io R. I. 79; and that one telegraph company could, as a "person,"
sue another fur failure to send a message: U S. Tel. Co. v. V. U. Tel. Co.
(1865), 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 46-54. And
that a fire insurance company was restrained, as a "person," from unlawfully exercising a franchise: People v.
Utica Ins. Co. (1818), 15 Johns. (N.Y.)
358 (marg.); and was a" living person"
within a statute allowing the examination of parties as witnesses: La Farge
v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co. (1860), 22
N. Y. 352; and a railroad company was
the same: Field v. N. Y. Cen. R. R.
(1859),29 Barb. (N.Y.) 176. And that
a newspaper publishing company was a
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certain that no attachment can be issued
under this act against domestic corporations, for they cannot conceal themselves
nor abscond. The Court have no doubt,
D. Or.) 13 Nat. Bank. Reg. 199; and
that a church was a "person" which
from a view of the whole act, that the
Legislature intended to authorize procould recover under a statute, for
property injured in a riot: St. Mfiehael's ceedings under it against natural perCAurch v. County (1847), Bright. (Pa.)
sons only. The twenty-first section
121. And that a university was a" persupposes that the person giving the
son" which could enter land under
security to appear and plead to any
a statute: State v. Nashville Univ. action to be brought, would, if within
the State, be subject to a suit; and we
(1843), 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157.
think a foreign corporation never could
So much for "miscellaneous" cases.
In at least two instances, it has been
be sued here. The process against a
held that an ordinary "business" cor- corporation must be served on its head,
poration is not a "'person" within the
or principal officer, within the jurisdiction of the sovereignty where this artifimeaning of the attachment laws. The
first is that of the President, &'c., of
cial body exists. If the president of a
Union Tnunpike Road v. Jenkins bank of another State were to come
(i8o6), 2 Mass. 37, which was an atwithin this State, he would not repretempt to attach money in the hands of sent the corporation here; his functions
"The New England Marine Insurance
and his character would not accompany
Co." The Court held that "an aggrehim, when he moved beyond the jurisgate corporation cannot be summoned
diction of the government under whose
as trustee," for which opinion it gave
laws be derived this character; and
no reason. In 1832, corporations were
though, possibly, it would be competent
made liable to process of foreign attachfor a foreign corporation to constitute an
ments in Massachusetts, and the Public
attorney to appear and plead to an acStatutes provide that "All personal ac- tion instituted in another jurisdiction,
tions, except actions of replevin and
we are clearly of the opinion that the
actions of tort for malicious prosecution,
legislature contemplated the case of a
for slander, either by writing or speak- liability to arrest, but for the circuming, and for assault and battery, may be
stance that the debtor was without the
commenced by trustee process, and any jurisdiction of the process of the courts
person or corporation may be summoned
of this State; and that the act, in all
as trustee of the defendant therein; but
its provisions, meant that attachments
a person who is not a resident of the should go against natural, not artificial,
,commonwealth, or a corporation which
or mere legal entities. The first section
is not established under its laws, shall
speaks of persons, and throughout the
not be so summoned, unless he or it has act, natural persons only were intended
a usual place of business in the comto be subjected to its provisions. It is
monwealth" (ed. 1882, chap. 183, 1, true that there are cases in which corpage 1052.
porate property has been held liable to
McQueen v. Middletown Afg. Co. be taxed under acts which subject the
(1819), 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 5 (marg.) was property of inhabitantsto taxation; but
an attempt to attach property of a for- in all such cases, the tax operated in
eign corporation. The law applied to the
rem, on the estate; and it has been held,
"estate of every debtor, residing out of that whoever resided on the property
the State." The Court said: "It is very represented in that respect the corpora*'person" within the meaning of the
U. S. Bankruptcy Laws: In re Oregon
Bulletin Co. (1875), (U. S. D. Ct.,
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tion, and, in the view of the act, were
inhabitants; but it would not be correct
to say abstractly, that the corporation,
.or mere legal entity, was an inhabitant.
The statute under consideration being
an innovation on the common law, it
ought not to be carried further, by construction, than the plain and manifest
intention of the Legislature indicates."
Of this, it was said in S. C. R. A'. Co.
v. McDonald (x&x8), 5 Ga. 531, " The
reasoning of the Court in that case is not
very satisfactory. And, moreover, the
provisions of the Statute of New York,
upon which that decision was made, are
somewhat different from those of our
.own act." And the weight of authority
is decidedly opposed to this view. Thus,
in People v. Briggs (872), 5o N. Y.
553, it was said that the word "person,"
in the attachment law, included corporations, and the same was held in Libbey
v. Ilodgdon (1838), 9 N. IH 394. In
Planters' &' Merchants' Bank v. Andrews (1839), 8 Por. (Ala.) 404, the
Court said: "The argument that natural
.persons are alone entitled or liable to
the process of attachment, cannot be
maintained. It is true that the statute
would seem to refer to such persons
only, yet it is well settled that the term
"person," in a statute, embraces not
only natural, but art,tcial persons;
unless its language indicates that it was
employed in a more limited sense, or
the subject matter of the act leads to a
different conclusion. In S. C. R.R. Co.
v. McDonald (1848), 5 Ga. 531, it was
held in an elaborate opinion, that a foreign corporation was a "person" within
the meaning of the attachment laws.
The Court said: "Corporations are to
be deemed and considered as persons,
when the circumstances in which they
are placed are identical with those of
natural persons expressly included in
the statutes."
And again, "Foreign
corporations are, equally with natural
persons, entitled to the remedy by atVOL. XXXVII.-x 9

tachment in our courts-the right and
the liability ought to be reciprocal," and
the Court called attention to a case
already cited (Benster, Garnishee v.
Farmers' Bank (1838), z2Pet. (37 U.
S.) 102; see opinion on page 134, a.),
wherein it was held that a corporation
was a "person" within the meaning of
the provisions of a Federal statute giving a preference to the United States in
the distribution of the effects of revenue
officers, "or other persons hereafter becoming indebted to the United States :"
Bal/o. - Ohio R. R. Co. v. Gallahues
Ad. (1855), 12 Grat. (Va.) 655. The
Court said: "The only particular in
which there is any departure from a
literal compliance with the statute, is in
regard to that provision of the seventeenth section which declares that when
any garnishee shall appear, he shall be
examined on oath. This clause was for
the benefit of the plaintiff in the attachment. In the case of a corporation, he
must receive an answer in the only
mode by which a corporation can
answer, under its corporate seal. In
chancery, where, as a general rule, all
answers must be verified by oath or
affirmation, a corporation must answer
in the same way, though, where a discovery is wanted, a practice has prevailed
of making some of the officers defendants. The same result could be arrived
at under the attachment law, by examining the officers as witnesses, if the
plaintiff suggests that a full disclosure
has not been made. This is an inconvenience to which he is subjected, growing out of the character of the garnishee, but furnishes no reason for exempting the corporation from being so
proceeded against when all the other
words in the statutes are sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace artificial as
well as natural persons. The mischief
intended to be remedied applies as well
to debts due by them as by individuals;
and the circumstances in which they
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are placed are the same as those of
others embraced in the statute."
Finally, may be mentioned the case
of the Alineral Point R. R. v. AKeep
(1859), 22 Ill. 9. This was an attempt
to attach the property of a non-resident
corporation. The Court called attention to the statutory provision that "the
word 'person' shall be deemed to extend
to and include bodies corporate, as well
as individuals." The reasoning of the
cases involving the construction of other
than attachment laws, is precisely similar to that of those just cited ; and the
result of them all is, that a corporation
is to be regarded as a "person" within
the meaning of a statute, wherever it
is possible so to regard it without implying an absurdity or an impossibility.
If this appear too strong a statement,
at least it cannot be denied that a corporation is primafacie a person, within
the statutory meaning of that term, and
that the burden is on him who seeks to
exempt it from the operation of any act
which applies to "persons," generally.
And this observation holds with respect to the municipal corporation, as
well as to other species of its genus.
When, therefore, an act provides that
any "person" may be garnisheed, to
establish an exception in favor of a
municipal corporation, on the ground
that this word does not apply to such a
body, it is necessary to adduce some
conclusive reason why it cannot, in the
nature of things, be so applied. Of
course, if something were required of
the "person " in any part of the act
which a municipal corporation could
not, from its peculiar constitution, perform, this requirement would be all
sufficient. Only one attempt has been
made to establish the exemption on this
ground with any degree of detail. This
was in the case of Mayor, &'c., of Mobile v. Roland &' Co. (1855), 26 Ala.
498, which was an attempt to attach the
salary of a police officer, which was not
due till towards the end of the month.

One section of the Code said that any
"person" might be garnisheed, and
another that "person"
where used
should include a corporation. The
Court said, first, "This must be under.
stood only of such provisions .as wi I
allow this signification to be given
without violating their evident sense and
meaning." And because it was provided in the attachment law that the
garnishee must appear and answer upon
oath, and might be orally examined,
etc., it said, "these, and similar provisions which might be mentioned, clearly
show that the statutes of garnishment
cannot be applied to corporations, which
from their impersonal, artificial character cannot be sworn; and cannot from
the nature of things personally appear
in court." Now, it would seem as if
these objections were sufficiently met by
the simple statement of the fact that, in
equitable or in any other proceedings
in our courts, municipal corporations do
actually appear and are examined
through their officers, without difficulty
and without embarrassment. And it is
evident moreover, that it applies to any
corporation, ordinary as well as municipal, and would, if it were sound, exempt from almost every legal and equitable liability all the vast business corporations of the country.
So similar in language are the attachment statutes of the various States that
this case may be said to exhaust the
argument which might be derived from
the provisions of any of them against
including municipal corporations among
the "persons" to which such statutes
allude. In not one of them is any
procedure demanded of 'the garnishee,
which is not among the established and
frequently exercised capacities of municipal, as of all other corporations. It
follows that if the former are to be exempted from garnishment, it must be on
other grounds than incapability.

J.T. RINGGOLD.
Bahltimore, Md.
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Sutpreme Court of Vernont.
HOWARD v. WITTERS.
A chattel mortgage, properly executed to secure a bona fide debt, takes precedence of a previous real estate mortgage, in which personalty is also mentioned
and attempted to be mortgaged, without complying with the statutory requisites.
Where the pos.ession of personal property is given to the buyer, and no reservation of title is made, there is no valid vendor's lien.

Exceptions from Chittenden County Court.
Trover for taking live stock and farming tools. At the trial,
September Term, 1887, the court directed a verdict for the
defendant.
The Revised Laws of Vermont, chapter 99 (edition of i88o,
page 405), provideSEC. 1965. All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the
provisions of this act.
SEC. x966. A mortgage of such personal property shall not be valid against any
person except the mortgagor, his executors and adminisirators, unless the possession of the property is delivered to, and retained by, the mortgagee, or the mortgage
is recorded in the office of the clerk of the town in which the mortgagor resides at
the time of making the same, or if he resides out of the State, in the town in which
the property is situated.
SEC. 1967. Each mortgagor and mortgagee shall make and subscribe an affidavit
in substance as follows:
"We severally swear that the foregoing mortgage is made for the purpose of
securing the debt specified in the conditions thereof, and for no other purpose,
and that the same is a just debt, due, and owing from the mortgagor to the mortgagee."
Which affidavit, with the certificate of the oath, signed by the authority administering the same, shall be appended to such mortgage, and recorded therewith.

SEC. 197o. Town clerks shall procure and keep a book of records for mortgages
of personal property; they shall record therein any mortgage, transfer or discharge,
and give a certified copy thereof when requested, on payment of their fees at the
rate of ten cents a folio; shall certify the time when the same is received and
recorded, and keep an alphabetical index of mortgagors and mortgagees, which
record and index shall be open to public inspection.
SEC. 1972. A mortgagor of personal property shall not sell nor pledge such
property mortgaged by him, without the consent of the mortgagee in writing upon
the back of the mortgage and on the margin of the record thereof, in the office
where such mortgage is recorded.
SEC. 1973. A mortgagor shall not execute a second or subsequent mortgage of
personal property while the same is subject to a previously existing mortgage given
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by such mortgagor, unless the fact of the existence of such previous mortgage is
set forth in the subsequent mortgage.

And in relation to liens, chapter ioO providesSEC. 1992. No lien, reserved on personal property sold conditionally and passing
into the hands of the conditional purchaser, shall be valid against attaching creditors, or subsequent purchasers without notice, unless the vendor of such property
takes a written memorandum, signed by the purchaser, witnessing such lien, and
the sum due thereon, and cause it to be recorded in the town clerk's office of the
town where the purchaser of such property resides, if he resides in the State, otherwise in the town clerk's office of the town where the vendor resides, within thirty
days after such property is delivered.

H. N. Deavitt and 0. P. Ray, for plaintiff
H. E. Powell, W. L. Burnap and C. W. Witters, for defendant.
POWERS, J. September 25, 1888. Lafave and wife conveyed
a farm, together with the live stock and farming tools in question, to Chevalier, on the 2oth day of May, 1882. This conveyance was by a warranty deed, and the personal property
passed absolutely. To secure the purchase money, Chevalier,
on the same day, executed an ordinary real estate mortgage to
the plaintiff, to secure $ i,ooo advanced by the plaintiff to Mrs.
Lafave for Chevalier, and another mortgage to Mrs. Lafave, to
secure the balance of the purchase money, and in both said
mortgages, attempted to mortgage said personal property. In
December, 1883, Chevalier, who had been in possession of the
farm and personal property since May 20, 1882, executed to
the defendant a chattel mortgage of the personal property
purchased of Lafave, as above stated, to secure a loan then
made to him by the defendant. Before taking the chattel
mortgage, the defendants examined the records of personal
mortgages and liens in the town clerk's office, and found no
incumbrance upon the property, and had no actual notice of
the contents of the plaintiff's deed.
The mortgage of the personal property by Chevalier to the
plaintiff was valid between the parties as a common-law mortgage; but as to subsequent purchasers, it created no lien
upon the property. It lacked the formalities requisite under
our statute to constitute a valid chattel mortgage as against
the defendant. It was not valid as a vendor's lien. The title
did not pass from Lafave to Chevalier conditionally, but abso-
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lutely. Lafave did not undertake to retain the title when he
parted with the possession, but conveyed both to Chevalier,
and undertook to make security by way of mortgage back from
Chevalier. This cannot be done as against innocent purchasers
under our statute relating to vendor's liens. The defendant's
mortgage was properly executed to secure a bona fide debt,
and it must take precedence of the plaintiff's improperly
executed one. The plaintiff and defendant are two innocent
parties suffering from the default of Chevalier, but the plaintiff
and his assignor made possible the contingency that has happened. The defendant's note, secured by her chattel mortgage,
had been lost at the time of the trial, but it appeared that the
officer making the sale had it at the time of sale, and his computation of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage was
based upon it. If Chevalier owed the debt secured by the
mortgage, the defendant had the right, under the statute, to
seize the property, and sell it. If the note then or since happened to be lost, the seizure is none the less legal.
The judgment is affirmed.
Upon no division of the vexed subject of the rights of vendors, on which
are based his remedies against the
goods themselves, in sales of personal
property, has there been more controversy than in regard to the scope of the
seller's lien. English courts, as well as
American, have found the greatest difficulty in determining whether the right
ofthe seller to withhold or countermand
delivery, in cases of failure to pay the
price agreed on, is a right of lien, in the
strict sense; or a recission of the contract; or a peculiar privilege which
must be classed by itself.
In view of these differences of judicial opinion, the subject of the seller's
lien presents elements of special interest
to the profession, such as should render
especially serviceable a consideration of
this topic, based on all the authorities
obtainable to date.
The general doctrine, authorizing the
remedy, which, however familiar, must

be outlined in the first instance, is to
the effect that a vendor of chattels has,
until delivery, a lien upon them for the
price: Clark v. Draper(1849), i9 N.
H. 419, 421 ; Parks v. Hall (1824), 2
Pick. (Mass.) 206, 214. [This princi-

ple applies, however, only to absolute
sales, and not to conditional ones, per
WILDE, J., Barret/v. Pritchard(1824),
2 Pick. (Mass.) 512, 515; in the case

of conditional sales, the title to the
goods remains in the vendor and the
question of lien does not arise: see
Haskins v. lVarren (1874), 115 Mass.
514, 533; note to Rawson A['f'g Co.v.
Richards (1887), 27 AMERICAN LAW
REGISTER 591.]

[The application of the general right
of lien upon undelivered personalty, is
not prevented by taking a negotiable
promissory note for the price, so long as
the note remains in the hands of the
vendor, ready for delivery to the vendee
on the discharge of the lien: Milliken
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v. Warren (1869), 57 Me. 46, 50;
.4rnold v. Delano (1849), 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 33, 39. Delivery is the important feature, as it terminates the lien,
though the purchase money is still unpaid and secured by a bond: Beam v.
Blanton (1843), 3 Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 59,
62. "The law, in holding that a vendor
who has thus given credit for goods,
waives his lien for the price, does so on
one implied condition, which is, that
the vendee shall keep his credit good.
If, therefore, before payment, the vendee become bankrupt, or insolvent, and
the vendor still retains the custody of
the goods, or any part of them, or if the
goods are in the hands of a carrier or
middleman, on their way to the vendee,
and have not yet got into his actual
possession, and the vendor, before they
do so, can regain his actual possession
by a stoppage in transitu; then his
lien is restored and he may hold the
goods as security for the price :" SHA'w,
C. J., Arnold v. Delano, supra ; cited
and followed by MILLER, J., Thompson
v. B. & 0. R. R.Co. (1867), 28 Md. 4o6.
"Judges do not ordinarily distinguish
between the retainer of goods by a
vendor, and their stoppage in transitu,
on account of the insolvency of the
vendee; because these terms refer to
the same right, only at different stages
of perfection and execution of the contract of sale. If a vendor has a right to
stop in transitu, a fortiori he has a
right of retainer before any transit has
commenced:"
LOWRIE, C. J., W57ite
v. Ielsh (x861), 38 Pa. 396, 420;
Grij/fths v. Prry
(1859), I E. & E.
(102 E. C. L.) 68o; APEwan v. Smith
(1849), 2 H. L. Cas. 309, 328; Dodsley
v. Varley (1840), 12 A. & E. (4o E. C.
L. 632.]
Where the goods are to be paid for
on delivery, hut the vendee refuses to
pay for them on the completion of the
delivery, the vendor has a lien for the
price and may resume possession of the

goods: Palmer v. Hand (x86), 13
Johns. (N. Y.) 434. It is further held
in this case, that if during the delivery,
or before it is completed, the vendee
sells or pledges the goods to a third
person, for a valuable consideration,
without notice to the original vendor,
the lien of the latter will not be affected,
but he may recover the goods from the
subsequent purchaser or vendee. (See
below.)
[The question of delivery being,
therefore, vital, the following expressions from a case where stoppage in
transitu was denied because of delivery
on board the consignee's own ship was
held to be the end of the transitus.
The goods had been sold on credit
and the consignee became insolvent
before the ship and cargo reached the
consignees. Two judges dissented on
the question of the transitusbeing complete; that is, in the application of the
principles laid down by the majority of
the court in these words:]
"Actual delivery, then, I understand,
to consist in the giving real possession
of the thing sold, to the vendee or his
servants, or special agents, who are
identified with him in law, and represent him. Constructive delivery is a
general term, comprehending all those
acts which, although not truly conferring
a real possession of the thing sold, have
been held, constructionejuris, equivalent to acts of real delivery. In this
sense, constructive delivery includes
symbolical delivery, and all those tradi.
tiones fictae, which have been admitted
into the law as sufficient to vest the absolute property in the vendee, and bar
the rights of lien and stoppage in Iransitu; such as marking and setting apart
the goods as belonging to the vendee,
charging him with warehouse rent,
&c.": ROGERS. ., Balin v. Huffnage
(1828), I Rawle (Pa.) 19-2o; Winfield's Adjudged Words, 17, 138.
[Where a quantity of pig iron was
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piled at the furnace and was pointed
,out by the seller to the agent of the
buyer, for the purpose of constructive
delivery, and, for the same purpose,
was charged on the seller's books to the
buyer, but no actual delivery was made,
the seller does not loose his lien, and
the buyer becoming insolvent, could
direct its shipment to other persons, for
the sellers own benefit: Thompson v.
B. & 0. R.R.Co. (1867), 28 Md. 396,
407.
MILLER, J., in delivering the
,opinion of the court, said: "The law
applicable to such a case as this prayer,"
for instructions to the jury, "presents,
is very clearly and accurately stated by
SHAW, C. J., in the case of Arnold v.
Delano (1849), 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33, 38,
39. There is, says he, manifestly a
marked distinction between those acts,
-which, as between vendor and vendee,
upon a contract of sale, go to make a
constructive delivery and to vest the
property in the vendee, and that actual
delivery by the vendor to the vendee,
which puts an end to the right of the
vendor to hold the goods as security for
.the price:" Id. 4o6. This is contrary
to Parksv,Hal(1824), 2 Pick. (Mass.)
2o6, 212, where it was held to be generally immaterial whether the delivery
be actual or constructive, and a constructive delivery, accordingto the contract ofsale, was held to be sufficient to
defeat the lien.]
Hence, in regard to the effect of constructive delivery upon the seller's lien,
there is a diversity of statement, and
even an apparent conflict of opinion.
This is not to be wondered at when due
note is taken of the diffe;ent senses in
which the term "delivery" is used in
the law of sales, and of the uncertain
scope of the distinction between actual
and constructive delivery.
("The term delivery is used in the
law of sales in very different senses. It
is used, in turn, to denote transfer of
title and transfer of possession; and

where the parties have agreed, and the
specific articles are appropriated and
accepted, then, independently of the
statute of frauds, it is often Paid, there
is sufficient delivery to pass the title,
although there be no transfer of possession. And this must be so, in order to
be consistent with the lien, which remains to the vendor, for the price:"
COLT, J., Morse v. Sherman (1871),
1o6 Mass. 430,433, and citations there.
Upon this statement of the law, an
action for goods bargained and sold was
sustained by evidence of a sale, " buyer's
option, sixty days," at the Boston Mining
and Stock Exchange, of shares of stock
then in the possession of the seller and
afterwards deposited with a trust company in part payment of the price.
"The specific shares were appropriated
to the defendants, the price was ascertained, the defendants were entitled to
obtain possession of them at any time,
upon payment of the balance of the
price; the receipt was merely in the
nature of a vendor's lien for the price,
and the whole transaction was assented
to by the defendants; and we are of
opinion that this amounted to a transfer
of the title, subject simply to the right
of the plaintiff to require the trust company to obtain the price before surrendering the possession of the certificates :"
C.ALLEN,J.,Frazierv. Simmons (1885),
139 Mass. 531 , 535, 536.]
That is, on the one hand, it is said
that generally it is immaterial whether
the delivery be actual or constructive:
Parksv. Hall and Arnold v. Delano,
supra; also, Mason v. Hatton (1877),
41 Up. Can. Q. B. 61o. On the other
hand, it has been declared that the lien
of the seller always exists until he voluntarily and utterly resigns the possession of the goods sold, and all right to
detain them; and that so long as the
vendor does not surrender actual possession, his lien remains, although he
may have performed acts which amount
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to a constructive delivery, so as to pass
the title or avoid the Statute of Frauds:
Thompson v. R. A'. Co., supra. The
latter statement seems more definite and
accurate than the former. For the seller's lien includes the right to countermand documents of transfer, as will be
presently seen, and this would hardly
comport with the former statement of
the law, as covering the broadest sense
of the term constructivedelivery; though
it might not be requisite that there
should be a delivery to the buyer per.
sonally, and a delivery to his servant or
agent, sometimes called constructive delivery, might suffice.
Thus, a delivery to a common carrier,
to be by him transported to the buyer,
has been held a delivery to the buyer,
such as passes the title and divests the
seller of his lien, since the carrier is the
agent of the buyer and receives the
goods for him ; Boyd v. AJosely (1853),
2 Swan. (Tenn.) 661, 663. But, of
course, such a delivery would not deprive the seller of his right of stoppage
in transitu.
Indeed, the rule is, that so long as the
vendor has the actual possession of the
goods, or as they are in the custody of
his agents, and while they are in transit
from him to the vendee, he has a right
to refuse or countermand the final delivery, if the vendee be in failing circumstances: White v. Welsh (1861), 38
Pa. 396,42o; Arnold v. Delano (1849),
4 Cush. (Mass.) 33, 39.
(Where notes are given, before maturity there is no lien; but after the
notes have been dishonored, and the
goods remain undelivered, the vendor's
lien attaches without dissolving the
original contract, and the vendees could
not recover the value of the goods:]
Valpy v. Oakelty (1851), 16 Ad. & El.
N. S. 941, 950.

Hence, this rule applies to a sale on
credit, so as to allow a refusal to deliver
possession if payment is not made when

the credit expires: Hunter v. Talbot
(1844), 3 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 74,
761; nor is the rule changed by the
fact that notes have been deposited as
collateral security, if no money has been
realized from them: Id.; and the rule
even applies if a third person, upon
whose credit the goods ordered were
sold, becomes insolvent: Wanamaker
v. erhes (1872), 70 Pa. 443, 445. Nor
does it matter whether the sale is of
specific chattels or an executory contract to supply goods: Gr-Yiithsv. Perry
(1859), 1 El. &. E. 6oo; or that the
property is identified or. designated:
Arnold v. Delano (1849), 4 Cush.
(Mass.) 33; Thompson v. Bait,Etc., R.
R. Co. (1867), 28 Md. 396.
[Where the contract was to supply
bleaching power in monthly portions,
and payment was to be received in
cash, fourteen days after each delivery,
the insolvency of the purchaser relieved the seller from delivering any
more goods, until tender of arrearages
and for goods to be presently delivered,
and no damages would be allowed for
such non-delivery:] Ex patte Chalmers (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 289,
291.

Withholding delivery may be the
remedy naturally available, where the
seller retains the custody of the goods
as bailee of the buyer, as under an arrangement to pay warehouse rent:
Grice v. Richardson (1877), L. R. 3
App. Ca. 319In many cases the vendor may have
given documents of transfer, and then
the question arises, can he countermand them?
In England, the vendor may stop
the delivery of the goods, under his
lien for the price, even if he has given
a delivery order for the goods, if such
order has not been presented to the
warehouseman, or other custodian of
the goods, and recognized by him:
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9 Daly (N. Y. C. P) 93. 99, per DALY,
C. J., citing many authorities.
[Where the purchasers agreed to ex& E. 680; Pooey v. Gt. West. Ry.
ecute a chattel mortgage, to secure the
Co. (1876), 34 L, T. (N. S.) 537.
price of certain hotel carpets, and deLike views are held in this country,
livery was made under this agreement,.
and the seller's lien is held not to be
before the execution of the chattel mortdivested by the endorsement and transgage, the agreement for such mortgage
fer of a delivery order for unpaid goods
could be enforced in equity and constill in the possession of the seller's
agent: Southwestern, tic., Co. v. Stanstituted an equitable lien against the
purchasers and all claiming under
ard (1869), 44 Mo. 81; [and a subthem, except bonafide purchasers withpurchaser, even holding an order for
out notice: but the legal title had
delivery accepted by the seller, has no
passed, and an action of trover against
greater rights than the original purchaser:] Southwestern, etc., Co. "v. the receiver ofthe purchasers, for selling
P ant (x87O), 45 id. 517. The same
the carpets, could not be sustained:.
Hustedv. Ingrahat (1878), 75 N. Y.
has been held of a warehouse order
251 ; Hale v. OnahaNat. Bank (1876),
which was countermanded before it was
64 Id. 555. See also Alexander v.
presented to the warehouseman: Aeeler
Heriot (1831), x Bail. Eq. (S. C.) 223,
v. Goodwin (1873), III Mass. 490,
APEwan v. Smith (1849), 2 H. L. Ca.
309; Grifphs v. Perry (z859), 1 E.

491,492; Ware River R. R. Co. v.
Vibard (1879), 114 id. 447, 454.
A tender of the price, even if not
accepted, puts an end to the lien upon
the goods sold: Aartindale v. Smith
(z841), 1 Q. B. 389, 395, 396. See
also .Demjpseyv. Carson (Trin.Term, 25
Vic.) Ix Up. Can. C. P. 462, 466.
A partial payment is insufficient to
extinguish the lien: Minzesheimer v.
Heine (1855), 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.)
65, 67; compare, however, Merchants'
Banking Co. v. Phenix B. S. Co.
(1877), L. R. 5 Ch. D. 205: S.C. 22
Eng. 33,46, where TEssEL, M. R. said,
"here it is a case of several payments
for several portions of goods, and that,
as regards these portions of the goods
which have been actually paid for,
there is no vendor's lien whatever."
Hence, a partial delivery does not
prevent the seller's lien reviving upon
the insolvency of the buyer, and attaching to the residue of the property remaining in the seller's custody; and
evenif the goods have been re-sold, the
vendor's lien is in no way affected, unless the seller knew and approved such
re-sale: Hambergerv.Rodman (i88o),

225.

An agreement against a resale until
payment of the price, does not give a
lien: Jelsh-v. Parish (1833), i Hill
(S. C.) I55, 163. "It is when put in
the strongest point of view, only a condition subsequent, constituting a personal undertaking ": per JOHNSON, J.,
Id. 163.
The superiority of vendors' lien on
cotton, under the laws of Alabama and
Louisiana, over the claims of parties intervening as pledgees, was in question
in Tyree v. Sands (1872),

24 La. An.

363, 364. HOWE, J., said, the vendors
"had their lien. They had a right to
rely upon it, as upon any other legal
protection. There can be no imprudent confidence in trusting one's property to the guardianship of the law.
The intervenors, bankers of Mobile,
knew the law, and were aware of the
They
possibility of plaintiffs' lien.
might have easily asked if the cotton
was paid fur; they might have required
their money to be used in payment for
it:" Id. 366. The lien was sustained.
[Where a mule was purchased at
public sale on a credit of nine months.
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-conditioned upon the purchaser giving
approved security, which was not given,
-the vendor had a lien, which he was
not bound to relinquish until the terms
-of sale had been complied with, and
could therefore sue for the price, though
the mule had not been delivered to the
purchaser: Wiade v. Afoffett (1859),
21 Ill.XIoj.

In short, when goods are sold and
there is no stipulation for credit, or time
allowed for payment, the vendor has,
by the common law, a lien for the price,
so that he is not bound to part with the
possession of the goods, without being
paid for them: Arnold v. Delano
(:849), 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33. Butthere
is no lien for the purchase money of
goods, with the possession of which the
vendor parts absolutely and unconditionally: Blackshearv. Burke (1883),
74 Ala. 239, 242. [And no equitable
or implied lien, while the vendee retains possession] : James v. Bird's
Admnr. (1837), 8 Leigh (Va.) 510.
[Therein personalty differs from real
estate. "By the Roman law, the vendor
could in such a case as this, resort to
the property; and so, I think, he may
by the civil code of France, notwithstanding article 1583. * * ** All contracts of sale, although positive in their
terms, according to these laws, have, it
is said, this implied condition: providedthe! rice istPaid." But "we were
referred to no case, on the argument,
and I think the search would be in
vain to find one, wherein it has been
decided in a court of law or equity in
this country, or in England, that, after a
sale of personal property and a fair and
absolute delivery to the purchaser personally, the vendor can reclaim the property because the consideration has not
been paid:" per MARCY, J.], Lupin
et at.Alarie &" Varet (1830), 6 Wend.

(N.- Y.) 77, 82, 83. "The law is well
settled, that, when one voluntarily delivers possession of property which is

pledged, or upon which a lien exists,
without any restriction or qualification,
and without insisting upon payment, it
is a release or waiver of any securityor
lien he may have upon such property,
for its price:" GARDNER, J., Wilkie
v.Day (1886), [41 Mass. 68, 73, citing
Farlowv. Ellis(186o), 15 Gray (Mass.)
229; Scudder v. Bradbury (1871), to6
Mass. 422; Haskins v. Warten(1874),
II5 Id. 514; Uftonv. SturbridgeMills
(1873), III Id. 446.
The right of lien depends upon the

possession (cases, suora); and to maintain it, a vendor must have the actual
or constructive possession of the goods:
Parks v. Hall (z824), 2 Pick. (Mass.
"1To tolerati a lien severed
206, 212.
from the possession by any device what-

ever, would be pregnant with all the
mischiefs of colorable ownership; GIBsON, C. J.,Jenkins v. Eichelberger
(1835), 4 Watts (Pa.) 123.
The principle that the surrender of
the possession is the extinction of the
lien, applies especially where the surrender is to a purchaser from the vendor, against whom the lien exists in
favor of his factor :" Guyn v. Richmond, etc., Ry. Co. (1881), 85 N. C. 4 2 9 .

[The principle is equally apjlicable
where the property is put in the possession of a brother of the vendor, who is
the servant of the vendee. "The property was in the use, and under the complete control and direction of Fuller,"
the vendee, "and to try to escape the
legal consequences of this condition, by
showing that the property was in the
possession of Fuller's hired servant, as
agent or trustee, would be an attempt
to evade the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds:"

HEYDENFELDT, J., Helm v.

Dumars (1853), 3 Cal. 454, 457.]
[The lien also attaches where drillings are delivered from time to time, to
be made into sacks, and the manufactured sacks are delivered back to the
seller, to hold until payment is made for
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the material. But there is no lien while
the drillings are in the buyer's posseszion, for manufacture into sacks; and
the buyer could have made a good title
upon are-sale: HdIeav.FhzI (1857),
7 Cal. 264.]
[Where, however, wool was sold at
an agreed price by weight, and removed
before payment to a warehouse, to be
packed and weighed, and, by the usual
course of dealing, the buyer would not
remove the wool from the warehouse
until payment, actual possession was
held to have been given as soon as the
wool "was weighed and packed; that
it was thenceforward at his," the
buyer's, "risk, and, if burnt, must have
been paid for by him. Consistently
with this, however, the plaintiff had,
not what is commonly called a lien, de-terminable on the loss of possession,
but a special interest, sometimes, but
improperly, called a lien, growing out
of his original ownership, independent
of the actual possession, and consistent
with.the property being in the defendanL This he retained in respect of the
term agreed on, that the goods should
not be removed to their ultimate place
of destination before payment. But
this lien is consistent, as we have seen,
-with the possession having passed to
the buyer, so that there may have been
a delivery to, and actual receipt by
him:" DENmqiAN, C. J.; and the seller
was given judgment for the price of the
goods notwithstanding the defence that
the goods had never been delivered:
DodSley v. Varley (1840) 12 A. &
E. x4.
Questions relating to express reser-

vations of the seller's lien; to the record and notice of such lien; to the
effect of sub-sales, and to conduct, estopping the seller from asserting his
rights, must be deferred for future discussion.
NATHAN NEWMARK.
San Francisco, Cal.

["The lien of the purchaser, for the
price of goods sold, originated with the
Roman Law, and afterwards became
incorporated into the Common law. It
is a right to retain goods sold, until the
whole price is paid. A partial payment, therefore, will not operate to
destroy the lien of the vendor upon all
the goods, but only to diminish it in
value; every single portion of the property sold, being covered by a lien for
the smallest fraction of the price:"
Story, Sales, 282 ; Exparle Chalmers,
L. R. 8 Ch. App. 289.
["The lien at common law, of the
vendor of personal property, to secure
the payment of the purchase money, is
lost by the voluntary and unconditional
delivery to the purchaser; but this d6es
not prevent the parties from contracting
for a lien which, as between themselves,
will be good after delivery :" W"AITE,
C. J., Gregory v. Morris (x877), 96 U.
S. 619; abstract s. c. 17 A.tER. LAw
REG. 601.
[There are special provisions, recognizing and enforcing this lien in the
statutes of California (Civil Code, ed.
1885, 3049); Dakota (Comp. Laws,
1887, 4439); Louisiana (R. Civ. Code,
U 3227-3231); and Tennessee (Code,
J. B. U.
1884, 2761).]
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Supreme Court of Minnesota.
MINNEAPOLIS THRESHING MACHINE CO. v. DAVIS.
A subscription by a number of persons to the stock of a corporation, to be thereafter formed by them, constitutes, first, a contract between the subscribers themselves to become stockholders when the corporation is formed, upon the conditions
expressed in the agreement, and as such it is binding and irrevocable from the date
of the subscription; second, it is in the nature of a continuing offer to the proposed
corporation, which, upon acceptance by it, becomes as to each subscriber, a contract between him and the corporation.
A promoter of a proposed corporation, who solicits and procures stock subscriptions upon a written subscription paper, is the agent of the body of the subscribers
to hold the subscriptions until the corporation is formed, and then turn them over
to it without any further act of delivery on the part of the subscribers. Hence, a
delivery of a subscription paper to such promoter is a complete delivery as to the
subscriber making such delivery, so that it becomes, to histanti, a binding contract
as between the subscribers.
Where a person subscribes to the stock of the proposed corporation and delivers
the subscription to such promoter, and other persons, without notice of any oral
condition attached to such delivery, also subscribe to the stock and pay the same
in, and in reliance on the subscriptions the corporation is organized, engages in its
business, expends large sums of money, and contracts liabilities therein, such person, when sued for instalments due on his stock subscription, will not be allowed
to defeat a recovery by showing that he attached a secret oral condition to the delivery of his subscription to the promoter.

Appeal from an order of the District Court for Hennepin
County, refusing a new trial after judgment for the defendant.
The material facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
C br Pond,for appellant.
Ferguson & Kneeland, for respondent.
MITCHELL, J., January 31, 1889. This was an action to recover instalments due on subscriptions to stock of the plaintiff
The facts fully appear from the findings of the court in connection with exhibits A and B attached to the complainL
Those material for present purposes are, that a scheme having been started to organize a manufacturing corporation with
$25o,ooo capital, whose works should be located at Junction
City, near Minneapolis, and one McDonald having proposed
that, if the citizens of Minneapolis would subscribe $190,000
to the capital stock, he would subscribe the remaining $6o,ooo,
one Janney, a promoter, but not a subscriber to the stock of
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the proposed corporation, acting as a voluntary solicitor, having with him the subscription paper (Exhibits A and B), about
April ist, 1887, proceeded to canvass for subscriptions to ihe
stock of the proposed corporation on the terms and conditions
embodied in the paper. He first applied to defendant, who
subscribed to $5,ooo of stock. Afterwards, and about the
same date, other citizens respectively subscribed to the stock,
on the same paper, to the aggregate amount, including defendant's subscription, of $I9o,ooo, of which over $65,ooo has
been paid in to plaintiff Thereupon McDonald, in accordance
with his proposition, subscribed the remaining $6o,ooo, which
lie has paid up in full. All the conditions expressed in the
written subscription (Exhibit A), having been fully performed
and complied with, the proposed corporation was afterwards,
about April 25th, 1887, organized, and these subscriptions to
its stock delivered over to it. The corporation, acting in good
faith upon such subscriptions, including that of defendant, expended large sums of money in locating and constructing its
works, and entered into large contracts, and incurred liabilities
to the amount of over $75,ooo. During all this time the corporation had no notice or knowledge of any condition being
attached to defendant's subscription, other than those expressed
in the subscription paper itself. Neither is it found or claimed
that any of the other subscribers to the stock had any such
notice or knowledge. Defendant was not present at the organization of the corporation, and never attended or took part in
any of its meetings, and had no notice or knowledge that the
subscription paper had been transferred or delivered over to
plaintiff, or that plaintiff relied on it, until about November,
1887, just prior to the commencement of this action.
Upon the trial, the defendant was permitted, against plaintiffs objection and exception, to testify that he signed or subscribed to the stock only upon the express oral condition and
agreement then had between him and Janney, that the latter
should retain in his possession said agreement with his name
signed thereto, and not deliver it to any one, or use it in any
way, until certain four persons should subscribe to the stock,
each in the sum of $5,ooo; that Janney took the agreement
from defendant on that express condition and understanding,
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and not otherwise; that none of these four persons ever did
subscribe to the stock of the plaintiff; and that defendant never
authorized Janney or any one to deliver said agreement to any
one except upon the condition referred to. The Court found
the facts to be in accordance with the testimony, and upon
that ground found as a conclusion of law, that defendant never
became a subscriber to the plaintiff's stock. The competency
of this evidence is the sole question in this case. Under the
elementary rule of evidence that a written agreement cannot
be varied or added to by parol, it is not competent for a subscriber to stock to allege that he is but a conditional subscriber. The condition must be inserted in the writing to be
effectual. This rule applies with special force to a case like
the present, where to allow the defendant now to set up a
secret parol arrangement by which he may be released, while
his fellow-subscribers continue to be bound, would be a fraud,
not only upon them, but upon the corporation which has been
organized on the faith of these subscriptions, and upon its
creditors. The defendant, of course, does not attempt to controvert so elementary a rule as the one suggested, but contends that the effect of this evidence was not to vary or contradict the terms of the writing, but to prove that there was
never any delivery of it, and hence that there never was any
contract at all, delivery being pre-requjsite to the very existence of a contract. His claim is that the subscription paper
was given to and received by Janney merely as an escrow, or
as in the nature of an escrow, only to be delivered or used
upon the performance of certain conditions precedent, and that
until they were performed there could be no valid delivery.
In determining this question, it becomes important to consider the nature of a subscription to the stock to a proposed
corporation, and the relation of the different parties to each
other, under the facts of this case. A subscription by a number of persons to the stock of a corporation to be thereafter
formed by them, has in law a double character. First, it is a
contract between the subscribers themselves to become stockholders, without further act on their part, immediately upon
the formation of the corporation. As such a contract, it is
binding and irrevocable from the date of the subscription, (at
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least in the absence of fraud or mistake,) unless cancelled by
consent of all the subscribers before acceptance by the corporation. Second, it is also in the nature of a continuing offer
to the proposed corporation, which, upon acceptance by it
after its formation, becomes as to each subscriber, a contract
between him and the corporation: I Morawetz on Priv. Corp.,
sec. 47 et seq.; Red Wing Hotel Co. v. Friedricli(1879), 26 Minn.
112. Janney, the promoter who solicited and obtained the
subscriptions, occupied the position of agent for the subscribers as a body, to hold the subscriptions until the corporation
was formed in accordance with the terms and conditions expressed in the agreement, and then turn it over to the company
without any further act of delivery on part of the subscribersThe corporation would then become the party to enforce the
rights of the whole body of subscribers.
It follows, then, that considering the subscription as a contract between the subscribers, a delivery to Janney by any subscriber, was a complete and valid delivery, so that his subscription became, eo instanti,a binding contract. The case
stands precisely as a case where a contract is delivered by the
obligor to the obligee. It cannot therefore be treated as a
case where a writing has been delivered to a third party in
escrow. The defendant, however, attempts to bring the case
within the rule of Westman v. Krmweide (1883), 30 Minn.
313, in which this Court held that parol evidence was admissible to show that a note delivered by the maker to the payee,
was not intended to be operative as a contract from its delivery,
but only upon the happening of some contingency, though
not expressed by its terms; that is, that the delivery was only
in the nature of an escrow. We so held upon what seemed
the great weight of authority, although the doctrine, even to
the extent it was applied in that case, is a somewhat dangerous
one. The distinction between proving by parol, that the delivery of a contractwas conditional, and that the contract itself
contained a condition not expressed in the writing, is one
founded more on refinement of logic than upon sound practical grounds. It endangers the salutary rule that written contracts shall not be varied by parol. Said ERI , J., in Pyr
v. Campbell (1856), 6 E. & B. 370, in sustaining such a de-
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fense, "I grant the risk that such a defence may be set up
without ground; and I agree that a jury should therefore always look on such a defense with suspicion." And in all the
cases where such a defense has been sustained, so far as we can
discover, they have been cases strictly between the original
parties, and where no one has changed his situation in reliance
upon the contract and in ignorance of the secret oral condition
attached to the delivery, and hence no question of equitable
estoppel arose. Many of the cases have been careful to expressly limit the rule to such cases: Benton v. .Afartin (1865),
31 N. Y. 382; Sweetv. Stevens (1863), 7 R. I. 375.
Conceding the rule of Westman v. Krumnweide, supra,to its
full extent, there are certain well recognized doctrines of the
law of equitable estoppel which render it inapplicable to the
facts of the present case. This subscription agreement was
not intended to be the sole contract of the defendant. It was
designed to be also signed by other parties, and from its very
nature the defendant must have known this. Each succeeding
subscriber executed it more or less upon the faith of the subscriptions of others preceding his. The paper purports on its
face to be a completed contract, containing all the terms and
conditions which the subscribers intended it should. When
this agreement was presented to others for subscription, defendant had not only signed it in this form, but he had also
done what, under the facts, constituted to all outward appearances at least, a complete and valid delivery. He had placed
it in the proper channel according to the ordinary and usual
course of procedure, for passing it over to the corporation,
when organized, and clothed Janney with all the indicia of
authority to hold and use it for that purpose, without any other
or further act on his part, untrammeled by any condition other
than those expressed in the writing. In reliance upon this,
others have not only subscribed to the stock but have since
paid in a large share of it. The corporation has been organized and engaged in business, expending large sums of money,
and contracting large liabilities, all upon the strength of these
subscriptions to its stock, and in entire ignorance of this secret oral condition which defendant now claims to have attached to the delivery.
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To permit defendant to relieve himself from liability on any
such ground under this state of facts, would be a fraud on
others who have subscribed and paid for stock; on the corporation which has been organized and incurred liabilities in
reliance upon the subscriptions; and on creditors who have
trusted it. The familiar principle of equitable estoppel by
conduct applies, viz., where a person by his words or conduct
wilfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain
state of facts, and induces him to act in that belief so as to
alter his own previous condition, he is estopped from denying
the truth of such facts to the prejudice of the other.
We have examined all of the numerous cases cited by the
defendant's counsel, and fail to find one which, in our judgment,
is analogous in its facts, or the law of which will cover the
present case. The two which at first sight might seem most
strongly in his favor are Railroad Co. v. Palmer(1865), 19
Wis. 574, and Railroad Co. v. Hall (1878), I Bradw. (Ill.),
612. But an examination of those cases will show that
in neither did or could any question of estoppel arise, and in
both the Court held that the person to whom the instrument
was delivered after signature, was a stranger to it, so that it
was strictly a delivery in escrow to a third party.
Cases are cited, where a surety signed a bond or non-negotiable note, and delivered it to the principal obligor, upon condition that it should not be delivered to the obligee until some
other person signed it, and where, without such signature, the
principal obligor delivered it to the obligee, and yet the courts
held that the surety was not liable, although the obligee had
no notice of the condition. Such cases usually, too, proceed
upon the theory that a delivery to the principal obligor under
such circumstances is a mere delivery in escrow to a stranger;
the term "stranger," in the law of escrows, being used in
opposition merely to the party to whom the contract runs. It
may well be doubted whether in such cases, where the instrument is complete on its face, the courts have not sometimes
ignored the law of equitable estoppel. No such defense would
be allowed in the case of negotiable paper, and it is not clear
why the distinction should be drawn on that line. The doctrine of estoppel rests upon totally different grounds, and
VOL. XXXVII.-2o
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operates independently of negotiability, being founded upon
principles of equity. But whether the cases referred to be
right or wrong, we do not see that they are in point here. Our
conclusion is that the Court erred in admitting the evidence
objected to, and for that reason a new trial must be awarded.
Order reversed.
i. The General Rule.-The established rule of evidence, that a written
contract is not to be contradicted or
varied by evidence of a parol agreement or understanding, is applied to
cases of subscription to the stock of
corporations. One reason for so applying this rule is, that, if such evidence
were admitted, it would tend strongly
towards the commission of a fraud upon
other subscribers to the stock : Angell
and Ames on Corporations, Sec. 531 ;
Waterman on Corporations, Sec. 193;
Cook on Stockholders, Sec. 137.
This principle, enlarged by judicial
construction into an equitable estoppel,
is applied by the Court in the principal
case. It was palpable that the admission of such evidence, for the purpose
of a judgment in favor of the defendant, operated unjustly toward other subscribers, who had made their stock subscriptions and became bound thereby,
and made payments thereon, in reliance
upon the subscription of the defendant.
It is only where the evidence of the
parol agreement tends to prove fraud,
accident or mistake, that it can be admitted in evidence and consideied:
Cook on Stockholders, Sec. 137; Waterman on Corporations, Sec. 192;
Angell & Ames on Corporations, Sec.
531.
The term "conditional subscription"
does not apply to the parol contract set
up by defendant in the principal case.
Conditional subscriptions proper, are
those only in which the condition is a
part of the subscription. There are
such conditions to the subscription in

that case. But oral agreements, contemporaneous with a subscription, will
not fall under this head; they are to
be considered under the head of fraud,
accident or mistake: Cook on Stockholders, Sees. 77, 137.
The release of other stockholders is
no defence to an action on a subscription: Cook on Stockholders, Sec. x91.
In England, it has been held that, in
such cases, the proper remedy of the
subscriber, who complains of the violation of the pazol agreement, is by action against the promoter who made the
agreement with him: Felyate's Case
(1865), 2 De G. J. ind S. 456.
2. Authorities Classfi6ed.-The circumstance that the subscription in the
principal case was given for the purpose of organizing a new corporation,
furnishes ground for a distinction between the various cases that have previously been decided.
An examination of the authorities,
with reference to this distinction, suggests this classification.
In the following named cases, the
rule was applied to subscriptions, given
before the organization of the corporation, for the purpose of promoting the
particular corporation: R. R. Co. v.
Afason (1857), 6 N. Y. 451 (attempt
by subscriber to revoke subscription);
R. R. Co. v. Cross (1859), 2o Ark. 443
(declaration by promoter as to location);
R. R. Co. v. Leach (1857) 4 Jones
(N. C.), 340 ; Miller v. R. R. Co.
(1878), 87 Pa. 95 (location of road);
Caley v. R. R. Co. (1876), 8o Id. 363;
Wi ht v. Shelby R. R. (1855), 16 B.
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Mon. (Ky.) 4 (a delivery of subcription claimed to he an escrow); A'. A'. Co.
v. Gammon (IS58), 5 Sneed ('enn.)
567, 571 (that subscribers should have
a voice in location of road); R. A'. Co.
v. Bo,ser"(1864),48 Pa. 29.
In the following named cases, the
same rule was applied to subscriptions
to an existing corporation: oerry Co.
v. Jones (1859), 39 N. II. 491, 497;
jfcChure v. le. A'. CO. (1879), 90 Pa.
269, 271 ; JfcCat)' v. A'. A'. Co'. (1878),
87 Id. 332; Scarle.t v. Aadeny of
,IAusir (t876), 46 Md. 132, 149; 60'502,
with v. Culver (1873), 69 Ill.
506; Gepeke v. Blake(1863), 15 Iowa
387; Jaek v. A'ber (1863), 5 Id. 450;
Doniev. IVhite (i86o). 12 Wis. 176;
R. R. Co. v. Stzens (855), 6 Ind.
379; R. A'. Co. v. l'earce (i867), 28
Id. 502; R. A'. Co. v. Brush (1875),
43 Conn. 86.
3. The Views if the Courts.-In
A'. A'. (18 5 5), x6 B.
Ifht'%, v. Sh//'l'
Mon. (Ky.) 4, the claim by the subscriber being that the delivery of his
subscription was simply in escrow, and
also that he had a parol condition as to
the location of the road, the Court held
that the party to whom the subscription
was delivered, being one of the commissioners for the subscription to the
road, could not receive it in escrow;
for, to make it an escrow, required that
the writing be put in the hands of a
third party. The Court said as follows:
"The defense relied upon by Wight,
that the subscription of stock made by
him was left with one of the commissioners in the nature of an escrow, is
wholly invalid. The commissioners
were the persons appointed by the
charter to receive and accept subscriptions of stock. A subscription received
by them, even if such a writing could
under any circumstances be made to
assume the nature and attributes of an
escrow, could not take that character,
inasmuch as when it was received by

them, it became just as obligatory on
the party making it as a promissory
note would be upon the maker who left
it with the payee, or his agent. The
well settled doctrine is, that to make a
writing an escrow merely, it must be
placed in the hands of a third person
by the party making it, to be delivered
to the other party on the happening of
a specified contingency. IHere thesubscribers were the parties on one side,
and the commissioners on the other. A
subscription when-made and received
by the commissioners, could not, therefore, be a mere escrow, but became in
law an absolute undertaking for the
stock subscribed according to the provisions of the charter. So far as the
defendants, or either of them, alleged
that the subscription was conditional,
and was not to be obligatory on them,
unless the road was located on a certain route, it is only necessary to remark
that the contract being in writing, parol
proof is inadmissible, to alter its terms
or to show that instead of being absolute as it purports to be, it was in reality conditional. The subscribers might
have annexed a condition to the terms
of their subscription, if they had thought
proper to do so, and it would then have
been with the commissioners to determine whether such conditional subscription of stock would be received; but
not having done so, they cannot, according to the well established doctrine
on the subject, allege or prove that the
contract was different from that which
is evidenced by the writing unless they
can establish fraud or mistake in its
execution."
In AMiller v. R. 1'. Co. (878), 87
Pa. 95, the Court said:
"Every one who signed after him,
did so on the faith of his signature,
* * * and to permit him now to set up
a secret parol arrangement, by which
he may be released whilst his fellows
continue to be bound, would be any-

-
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thing but just. As was said inthecase
of Graff v. R. R. Co. (1858), 31 Pa.
489, a subscription to a joint stock
company is not only an undertaking
to the company, but with all other
subscribers."
In R. R. Co. v. Gammon (1858), 5
Sneed (Tenn.) 367, where the parol
condition set up was, that the subscriber should have voice in the location of the road, the Court said: "By
his subscription for a certain number of
shares, at a certain sum, he became
liable for the amount of his subscription, on the same principle that the
maker of a promissory note renders
himself liable. The subscription being
equivalent to a promissory note, it is
clear that parol evidence of previous or
contemporaneous negotiations, stipulations or terms, not incorporated in the
subscription paper, could not be admitted to vary or contradict the terms
of the written instrument.
In Ferry Co. v. Jones (1859), 39 N.
H. 491, the defendant set up a repre-sentation to him by another subscriber,
-not an officer, that the ferry to be built
was to be a horse ferry; in fact, a steam
ferry was built. It was held that the
party making the representation was not
an agent of the company, and that the
company would not have been bound
by the representation, even it he had
been its agent. The Court said:
"Another question raised is, whether
the representation made at the time the
defendant and Somerby subscribed for
stock, by the person who bad the paper,
was competent evidence to be considered, and if so, was it material? Did
it or could it affect the case ? We think
it was not competent, and would not
have been so, even if the person making
it had been the agent of the company.
It was only a verbal statement, and
does not come within the rule stated in
Uhite Mlountains R. R. v. Eastman
(1856), 34 N. H. 124, where it was

held that a contract, in writing, given
back to a subscriber for stock, at the
same time of the subscription, by an
agent of the company authorized to
contract, providing that the terms of the
subscription might be modified in a certain way, might be valid as part of the
original contract of subscription, as between the parties, provided it did not
operate as a fraud upon others. But
this case is more like George v. 11arris
(1829), 4 N. H. 533, where it washeld
that where a promise is direct, positive,
unconditional, and in writing, parol
evidence is inadmissible to contradict
or vary such contract. And the further
reason then stated also applies here,
that the defendant's putting upon paper
an unconditional promise to pay, may
have induced others, not only to subscribe, but to pay, and his attempts now
to shield himself by this private understanding may be a fraud upon others,
who have thus been induced to subscribe and to pay. Parol agreements,
made at the time of subscribing for
stock, and inconsistent with the written
terms of subscription, are inadmissible,
inoperative and void: Conn. &6 Pass.
River R. R. v. Bailey (1852), 24 Vt.
465."
In ArcCarty v.R.R. (1878),87 Pa.
332,the subscriber alleged a parol condition, that the road was to be built to
a certain point; and a further promise
by the officers of the road to incorporate
this condition into his subscription; so
that the case turned on a question of
fraud. The Court said as follows:
"Where subscriptions are made to
the stock of a proposed public corporation, previous to and for the purpose of
procuring a charter, any condition annexed thereto, whether written orparol,
are void. But after the organization of
the company, a condition is binding
and obligatory, and ordinarily, this is
so, though it rests in parol, if, except
for such condition, the subscription.
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tary law, that all negotiations between
the parties, relating to the subject matter,
are merged in the written contract.
Neither party will, therefore, be permitted to prove by l)arol, a contract
different from that expre. ,ed in the
written instrument. Is it so that a
party, for the purpose of relieving himself of an obligation, will be permitted
95."
In Corrwith v. Cu/,- (IS7 3 ), 69 I11. to show by parol that this written contract is different from what it purports
502, the defendant had never delivered
to be on its face? We are not aware
the subscription. It had remained in
of any principle of law that will justify
his possession, and had never passed
into the bands of the corporation. l)e- such a proceeding."
fendant claimed that it was to be deliv4. Delivejy in L-scrorw.-Among the
ered only on condition that he could
cases above cited are the following, in
which the question was, as in the prineffect a certain loan, which he had failed
cipal case, one of a condition to the
to do. It was held to be a valid subdelivery of the subscription: lihit v.
scription. The Court said:
"T he subscription by the defendant
R. R. Co. (1855), 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 4;
was absoute on its fice; it is inadmisCo,-ulith v. Cueer (1873), 69 IL 502.
There are two cases found in the
sible to show that it was only conditional. The rule forbidding the intro- books, in which the parol condition as
to delivery, was allowed to defeat the
duction of parol evidence to explain a
written instrument, meets with no exsubscril)tion and excuse the subscriber
from compliance; but each of these
ception in the case of a subscription
cases is one of subscription to the stock
paper for stock of a corporation: Angell and Ames on Corp., 146 ; Banet of an already existing corporation.
These are the two named in the princiv. A. C' S. R. R. Co. (185), 13 111.509.
pal case: R. R. Co. v. Painter(1865),
Such a secret condition attached to the
19 Wis. 574; A'.A'. Co. v. flall (1878),
subscription, would be a fraud upon the
i lradw. (ILL.) 612.
other subscribers, and the subscription
In the Wisconsin case, the subscripshould be enforced without regard to
tion was not signed by the supposed
it: Drvnie v. 'hite (s86o), 12 Wis.
176; IVhite Afount. R. R. v. Eastman subscriber, but by another person for
him, who was a promoter, not of the
(1856), 34 N. II. 124; Mlann v. Cook
corporation, Lut of the particular sub(I85o), 20 Conn. 178; Smith v.Iledscription. The supposed subscriber
ed-er (1866), 39 Mo. 157."
authorized the delivery of this subscripIn R. R. Co. v. B-ush, 43 Conn. 86
tion, only upon certain conditions which
the language of the Court was as folhad not been performed. The Court
lows:
"When Myers & Co. subscribed, the held, that as the promoter who received
the subscription was not an agent of the
contract for building the road had not
been executed. The subscription there- company, he was therefore a third party;
so that the principles as to a delivery
fore was not then affected by the written
In the
in escrow were applicable.
contract. The parolagreement cannot,
Illinois case, there was a conditional
upon any principle, have the effect to
delivery of the subscription in escrow
vary or qualify the written con'tract of
to the Director of the Railroad Coin
subscription. It is familiar and elemenwould not have been made. The latter
part of this proposition is subject, however, to the qualification that the rights
of co-subscribers are not affected thereby: R. R. v. Borsr,v'(1864),48 Pa. 29;
Cale, v. R. R. Co. (1876), So Id. 363;
Graff v. R. R. Co. (1858), 31 Id. 489;
and Aliler v. R. R. Co. (18 7 8), 87 ld.
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pany; and the Court held that the facts
of the case made this director a third
party, so that the delivery was really in
escrow.
There are other cases, seemingly
analogous here, yet to be distinguished
by their facts. In Ticonic Water Co. v.
Lang (1874), 63 Me. 480, the question
of delivery related to a proxy. One
defendant had never subscribed to the
stock at all; and he had delivered a
proxy in escrow, which was considered
inthecase. Cassv. Railway Co. (1875),
8o Pa. 31, is not in point. It was a
case of an existing corporation and a
written condition in a subscription.
The agent of the company took the
subscription in escrow. It was held
that this agent had no authority to
accept the written condition, hence,
there was no delivery. Burrows v.
Smith (1853), 1o N. Y. 550, a case in
equity, did not turn on the question of
a parol condition to a written subscription. Plaintiff did not sue on the written subscription; his suit was an effort
to set up another and different subscription by estoppel, against which the
Equity Court let in evidence of parol
stipulations.
The principal case is the first one in
which an appellate court has passed
upon the question of an attempted condition to the delivery of a stock subscription given for the purpose of promoting a new corporation.
5. The .Status of the Subscriitioz
Agreement.-Tle ruling in the principal
case as to the double character of the
subscription agreement, is well supported by authority. It is a general
rule that an agreement to take shares
in order to form a corporation, is a continuing offer, subject to acceptance by
the corporation after it is formed: I
Morawetz on Corporations, Sec. 47, 48,
51. The subscription inures to the
benefit of the corporation when formed:
W1aterman on Corporations, Sec. 177;

R. R. Co. v. Gammon (1858), 5 Sneed
(Tenn.) 567; Taggart v. R. R. Co.
(1866),24Md. 563; R.R. Co.v. Clayes
(18 4 8),2xVt. 3 0; RR. Co.v.Dummer
(1855),4OMe. 172; R.R. Co.v. Mason
(1857), z6 N. Y. 45!.
The subscriber's interest in, and his
right to, a share in the operations of the
company, are the consideration for his
contract: i Morawetz on Corporations,
Sec. 56; R. R. Co. v. Robbins (x877),
23 Minn. 439; Atusic Hall Co. v. Cary
x16 Mass. 471 ; R. R. Co. v. Clayes, 31
Vt. 30.
The corporation is the proper party
to bring suit on such subscription: i
Morawetz on Corp., Sec. 50; Cook on
Stockholders, Sec. 67; Music Hall Co.
v. Cary (1874), z16 Mass. 471 ; Upton
v. Tribilock (1875),91 U. S. 45; Chubb
v. Upton (1877), 95 Id. 665.
Mr. Taylor's full statement of the
doctrine is as follows:
"The corporation having betn formed,
and A, not having in the meantime
withdrawn from the agreement, if B, C
and D, etc., take and pay for their
shares as agreed, they (or the corporation, if it shall appear to have been the
intention that the corporation should
have the right to enforce the promise)
can then force A to take and pay for his
shares as well; for if, relying on A's
promise, or, more strictly speaking, unwithdrawn offer to take shares, B, C and
D, etc., have actually taken shares
themselves, they have thereby accepted
A's unwithdrawn offer, by performing
that act, which was intended to be,
when performed, a valid consideration,
which should convert A's unwithdrawn
offer into a binding promise; and in
truth, therefore, they have thus transformed A's unwithdrawn offer into a
binding promise, the performance of
which may be enforced by the parties
who have themselves performed, or by
the corporation, if such was the intention :" Taylor on Corporations, 93.

